Suchergebnisse

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has produced four waves of regulatory management indicators. By contrast, the European Union has never adopted a common system of indicators, although it is much more integrated and less heterogeneous than the OECD. This cannot be explained by the different propensity for performance measurement: the European Union has agreed on policy metrics in economic and social policy areas, and regulation is a fundamental tool for this organization. Although structural variables matter, to answer questions about adoption (Yes/No), timing (when) and content of indicators (what type of indicators) we need the additional aid of policy learning and empirical observations on organizational processes. We find that the OECD process was one of self-directed learning fuelled by high socialization, internal validation of knowledge, favorable attitudes and posture of the secretariat, and mutually constitutive roles of delegates and staff. For the European Union we find the reverse. These findings contribute to the literature on policy learning, regulation, and global performance measurement.

In their attempt to promote 'better regulation', governments have ended up with increasing regulation of rule-making. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a manifestation of this trend. This article draws on the positive political economy hypothesis that RIA is an administrative control device. Rational politicians-positive political economy argues-design administrative requirements to solve problems of political uncertainty. This is a rather abstract hypothesis but with clearly observable implications. Empirical analysis on Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU shows that the modes and level of control vary, with almost no evidence supporting the positive political economy hypothesis in Denmark and Sweden and more robust evidence in the other cases, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The EU scores high, but control has both a political component and an infra-organizational dimension. In between the extremes I find modest levels of political control in Canada and the Netherlands. Adapted from the source document.

This article provides some reflective thoughts on current research on regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in Europe.The narrative draws on the author's fieldwork diaries. It starts from the methodological problems of identifying and analysing regulatory impact assessment in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.This leads to more fundamental theoretical questions about research design, the relationship between supply and demand of research and, ultimately, the aims of academic research in this area.The conclusions draw lessons for the emerging research agenda on better regulation.The main problem is not whether `real' RIAs exist or not, since this would be equivalent to trying to fit the amoeba-like RIA `substance' into our abstract`forms'.The interesting problems are: what are the functions of different approaches to assessment, how are they used and how can they improve governance?

A review essay on books by (1) Christopher Ham & Michael Hill, Introduzione all'analisi delle politiche pubbliche ([Introduction to the Analysis of Public Policy] Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1995); (2) Michael Howlett & M. Ramesh, Come studiare le politiche pubbliche ([How to Study Public Policy] Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 2003); (3) Giorgio Freddi (Ed), Scienza dell'amministrazione e politiche pubbliche ([The Science of Public Policy and Administration] Rome: Carocci, 1989); (4) Yves Meny & Jean-Claude Thoenig, Le politiche pubbliche ([Public Policy] Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1996); & (5) Gloria Regonini, Capire le politiche pubbliche ([Undertanding Public Policy] Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 2001). Tables, References.