Nuo 2007 m. rugsėjo Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų institutas kartu su Kauno technologijos ir Mykolo Romerio universitetais įgyvendina ambicingą projektą "Demokratija žinių visuomenėje: iššūkių ir galimybių analizė" (e. demokratija). Projekto tikslas – nustatyti esmines demokratijos funkcionavimo šiuolaikinėje informacinėje visuomenėje problemas ir pasiūlyti efektyvius būdus joms spręsti, taikant naująsias informacines technologijas. Projektą remia Lietuvos valstybinis mokslo ir studijų fondas. [...]
The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
Why do people tend to vote for the same political party many years, despite the fact that parties change their electoral programs, their leaders and their candidates in elections? Why do they tend to justify the actions of the party much more easily than others? The answer to those questions is provided by the party identification theory originating in the prominent Michigan school of electoral behaviour research.While there is some evidence that party identification is decreasing in Western countries, the concept is still widely discussed and used in electoral research. There is a huge amount of literature on the measurement issues, changing level of partisanship in US, Europe and other countries, on the determinants and the effects of party identification. The empirical evidence on the formation of the party identification in new democracies, however, is scarce. The case of Lithuania, therefore, is interesting and informative.The aim of the article is to examine the factors of the emergence of party identification in Lithuania, trying to reveal the mechanisms of the formation of partisanship in the emergent state of party system formation. The analysis is based on the data from the representative face-to-face post-electoral survey carried out in 13 November – 10 December 2012 (N = 1500) for the Lithuanian National Election Study.In the first part of the article, the two rival theories of party identification are introduced and hypotheses about the factors of party identification formation are presented. In the second part, the methodological issues of measurement of party identification are discussed and the level of party identification in Lithuania is examined. The third part of the article focuses on the determinants of party identification. Three main hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis presumes that party identification derives from the political socialisation in family and depends on the party identification of parents. Family socialisation in Lithuania, however, should only have an impact on those who were born after 1972 because they received their political socialisation in democratic regime. The second hypothesis is related to the theory of social cleavages. It states that the probability of having party identification is bigger for those who feel the salient social cleavage in the society and recognize its political relevance. Finally, the third hypothesis, based on the theoretical claim of Philip Converse, is that party identification depends on the length of democratic experience of electorate.Careful analysis of the level of party identification reveals that no less than a third of Lithuanian electorate could be characterised as party identifiers. Only half of them, however, have an affective relation with their party. The partisanship of the others seems to be based on rational evaluation rather than psychological attachment. The three parties that have most of partisan supporters are the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the Labour Party and the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats.The results of the analysis reveal that consistent party identification of parents has an impact on the party identification of their children. The effect, however, is not different for those who are born before and after 1972. It suggests that this is the effect of social network rather than family socialisation. The probability to have a party identification is higher for those who are most anti-communist as it is the dominant political cleavage in Lithuania. The impact, however, is mediated by age and moderated by interest in politics.The impact of age on party identification is considerable but not consistent with the hypothesis. The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991. ; Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas partinės tapatybės reiškinys Lietuvoje, remiantis 2012 m. porinkiminės gyventojų apklausos duomenimis. Pirmoje straipsnio dalyje aptariamos skirtingos partinės tapatybės teorijos ir suformuluojamos hipotezės apie partinę tapatybę Lietuvoje galinčius lemti veiksnius. Antroje dalyje aptariamos metodologinės partinės tapatybės matavimo problemos ir analizuojamas partinės tapatybės Lietuvoje lygis. Trečioji dalis skirta partinės tapatybės formavimosi aiškinimui. Tikrinamos trys pagrindinės hipotezės – 1) partinę tapatybę lemia politinė socializacija šeimoje;2) partinė tapatybė susiformuoja politinių skirčių pagrindu; 3) politinė tapatybė priklauso nuo dalyvavimo demokratiniame procese patirties kaupimo laiko. Straipsnyje pristatomi logistinės regresijos rezultatai verčia koreguoti partinės tapatybės teoriją.
The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
Why do people tend to vote for the same political party many years, despite the fact that parties change their electoral programs, their leaders and their candidates in elections? Why do they tend to justify the actions of the party much more easily than others? The answer to those questions is provided by the party identification theory originating in the prominent Michigan school of electoral behaviour research.While there is some evidence that party identification is decreasing in Western countries, the concept is still widely discussed and used in electoral research. There is a huge amount of literature on the measurement issues, changing level of partisanship in US, Europe and other countries, on the determinants and the effects of party identification. The empirical evidence on the formation of the party identification in new democracies, however, is scarce. The case of Lithuania, therefore, is interesting and informative.The aim of the article is to examine the factors of the emergence of party identification in Lithuania, trying to reveal the mechanisms of the formation of partisanship in the emergent state of party system formation. The analysis is based on the data from the representative face-to-face post-electoral survey carried out in 13 November – 10 December 2012 (N = 1500) for the Lithuanian National Election Study.In the first part of the article, the two rival theories of party identification are introduced and hypotheses about the factors of party identification formation are presented. In the second part, the methodological issues of measurement of party identification are discussed and the level of party identification in Lithuania is examined. The third part of the article focuses on the determinants of party identification. Three main hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis presumes that party identification derives from the political socialisation in family and depends on the party identification of parents. Family socialisation in Lithuania, however, should only have an impact on those who were born after 1972 because they received their political socialisation in democratic regime. The second hypothesis is related to the theory of social cleavages. It states that the probability of having party identification is bigger for those who feel the salient social cleavage in the society and recognize its political relevance. Finally, the third hypothesis, based on the theoretical claim of Philip Converse, is that party identification depends on the length of democratic experience of electorate.Careful analysis of the level of party identification reveals that no less than a third of Lithuanian electorate could be characterised as party identifiers. Only half of them, however, have an affective relation with their party. The partisanship of the others seems to be based on rational evaluation rather than psychological attachment. The three parties that have most of partisan supporters are the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the Labour Party and the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats.The results of the analysis reveal that consistent party identification of parents has an impact on the party identification of their children. The effect, however, is not different for those who are born before and after 1972. It suggests that this is the effect of social network rather than family socialisation. The probability to have a party identification is higher for those who are most anti-communist as it is the dominant political cleavage in Lithuania. The impact, however, is mediated by age and moderated by interest in politics.The impact of age on party identification is considerable but not consistent with the hypothesis. The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens. The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 postelectoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens.The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 post-electoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance. ; Santrauka. Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kas lemia dabartinių Lietuvos gyventojų sovietinės praeities vertinimą. Remiantis reprezentatyvios 2012 m. porinkiminės Lietuvos gyventojų apklausos duomenimis, tikrinamos hipotezės, išplaukiančios iš socialinių skirčių teorijos. Logistinės regresijos rezultatai parodė, kad sovietmečio vertinimas susijęs ne su dabartine ekonomine padėtimi, bet su subjektyviai jaučiamu socialinio statuso pokyčiu ir sovietmečiu patirtomis represijomis. Dar didesnį poveikį sovietmečio vertinimui turi socialinė aplinka ir dalyvavimo Sąjūdyje patirtis bei vertybiniai ideologiniai įsitikinimai. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: politinė skirtis, rinkiminis elgesys, politinės nuostatos, sovietmečio nostalgija. Keywords: political cleavage, electoral behaviour, political attitudes, soviet nostalgia. ABSTRACT WHO IS NOSTALGIC ABOUT THE SOVIET PAST? THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC STATUS, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS ON THE SOVIET – ANTI-SOVIET CLEAVAGE IN LITHUANIA While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens.The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 post-electoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens. The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 postelectoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens. The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 postelectoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens. The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 postelectoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
While more than 20 years have passed from the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Lithuanian society is still deeply divided by different attitudes towards the life in the former regime. The soviet – anti-soviet attitudes allow predicting voting behavior of the Lithuanian electorate far better than any other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor. The goal of the article is to explore the determinants of the attitudes toward the soviet past of the Lithuanian citizens. The article tests the hypotheses based on the theory of political cleavages using the data of the 2012 post-electoral survey. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate that the attitudes towards the soviet past are explained by the change of social status rather than current economic position of inhabitants. Moreover, personal social networks and the experience of political mobilization in the late 1980-ies are much better predictors of the anti-soviet attitudes than socioeconomic factors. Finally, ideological beliefs appeared to have independent impact on the anti-soviet stance.
In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
In analysing the dynamics and mechanisms of mass protest from 1987 to 1988 in Lithuania, this article explores what kind of social ties – strong or weak – are conducive to the mobilisation of collective action in a (post-)totalitarian society. The empirical analysis is based on data collected as part of the 2009-2011 research project 'The Phenomenon of Sąjūdis: Network Analysis of a Civic Movement'. First, the article defines the distinction between strong and weak ties, and highlights the importance of social networks for the mobilisation of collective action. Second, it analyses the micro-structure of Lithuanian society in the Soviet period. Based on the type of network ties, three distinct social arenas are distinguished: underground society, alternative legal society and official society. Finally, the article analyses which of these arenas could be seen as the seedbed of the Sąjūdis movement. Also demonstrated is the distinct role of different kinds of social ties at different stages in the development of the movement.
