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Working paper
Growth, Automation and the Long Run Share of Labor
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14286
SSRN
Working paper
Certified Random: A New Order for Coauthorship
In: American economic review, Band 108, Heft 2, S. 489-520
ISSN: 1944-7981
Alphabetical name order is the norm for joint publications in economics. However, alphabetical order confers greater benefits on the first author. In a two-author model, we introduce and study certified random order: the uniform randomization of names made universally known by a commonly understood symbol. Certified random order (i) distributes the gain from first authorship evenly over the alphabet; (ii) allows either author to signal when contributions are extremely unequal; (iii) will invade an environment where alphabetical order is dominant; (iv) is robust to deviations; (v) may be ex ante more efficient than alphabetical order; and (vi) is no more complex than the existing alphabetical system modified by occasional reversal of name order. (JEL A14, Z13)
SSRN
Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set
SSRN
Working paper
Groups in conflict: size matters, but not in the way you think
Trabajo presentado en el Workshop on Conflict organizado por el Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) en Milán, los días 4 y 5 de mayo de 2017 ; This paper studies costly conflict over private and public goods. Oil is an example of the former, political power an example of the latter. Groups involved in conflict are likely to be small when the prize is private, and large when the prize is public. We examine these implications empirically by constructing a global dataset at the ethnic group level and studying conflict along ethnic lines. Our theoretical predictions find significant confirmation in an empirical setting. ; Ray thanks the National Science Foundation for research support under grant number SES-1261560 ; Peer reviewed
BASE
Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets
In: Economica, Band 83, Heft 329, S. 59-90
ISSN: 1468-0335
SSRN
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
In: Journal of political economy, Band 122, Heft 4, S. 719-765
ISSN: 1537-534X
SSRN
Working paper
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
In: Journal of political economy, Band 122, Heft 4
ISSN: 0022-3808
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect. These findings speak to the origins of Hindu-Muslim violence in post-Independence India. Adapted from the source document.
Coalition formation
This chapter surveys the sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents ("coalitions") deliberately get together to jointly determine their actions. The defining idea of a coalition, in this chapter, is that of a group which can coordinate agreements among its members, while it interacts noncooperatively with other non-member individuals and the outside world in general. It is hard to overstate the importance of coalition formation in economic, political and social analysis. Ray (2007) gives several examples in which such a framework comes to life: cartel formation, lobbies, customs unions, conflict, public goods provision, political party formation, and so on. Yet as one surveys the landscape of this area of research, the first feature that attracts attention is the fragmented nature of the literature. The theories that bear on our questions range from collusive behavior in repeated games, to models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative games. To unravel the many intricacies of this literature would take far more than a survey. To prevent our terms of inquiry from becoming unmanageably large, we impose a basic restriction.
BASE
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19090
SSRN
Working paper
Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization
In: American economic review, Band 101, Heft 4, S. 1345-1374
ISSN: 1944-7981
In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that a suitable monotone transform of the equilibrium level of conflict can be proxied by a linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray. (JEL D31, D63, D74)
Poverty and Disequalization
In: Journal of globalization and development, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 1948-1837