Suchergebnisse

One of the many factors that is thought to make it possible for a state to abstain from participating in a war between two or more other states is the existence of international norms that support the concept of neutrality. According to realist theory, these norms are most likely to arise in balance-of-power systems, when alliances are flexible and military capabilities are distributed among the great powers in a pattern of approximate parity. Conversely, they are expected to decay when alliances become polarized into rigid blocs and military capabilities are highly concentrated. Based on the results of a time-series analysis of data from the 1820-1969 period, it was concluded that alliance polarization had no statistically significant impact on the salience of neutrality norms. On the other hand, the distribution of military capabilities did have a significant impact under certain conditions. During periods when ongoing warfare did not include the great powers, the salience of neutrality norms increased as military capabilities became more dispersed toward a pattern of rough equality.

The proposition that democracies rarely fight one another has been well-substantiated by empirical research. A prominent explanation for this finding is that shared norms fostered by a democratic political culture promote peaceful conflict resolution. Joint democratic dyads allegedly have a greater propensity than other types of dyads to entrust third parties with judicial competence to settle their disputes. The results from a study of 206 dyadic disputes involving third-party intermediaries support this claim. The presence of joint democracy in dangerous, war-prone dyads has a strong positive effect on the probability of referring interstate disputes to binding third-party settlement, even when controlling for alliance bonds and geographic proximity. In addition, the more a joint democratic dyad is marked by coherent regimes or a rough parity in the distribution of military capabilities, the greater the propensity to refer disputes to binding third-party settlement.