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Similar to the early days of the Internet, today, the effectiveness and applicability of legal regulations are being challenged by the advent of blockchain technology. Yet, unlike the Internet, which has evolved into an increasingly centralized system that was largely brought within the reach of the law, blockchain technology still resists regulation and is thus described by some as being "alegal", i.e., situated beyond the boundaries of existing legal orders and, therefore, challenging them. This article investigates whether blockchain technology can indeed be qualified as alegal and the extent to which such technology can be brought back within the boundaries of a legal order by means of targeted policies. First, the article explores the features of blockchain-based systems, which make them hard to regulate, mainly due to their approach to disintermediation. Second, drawing from the notion of alegality in legal philosophy, the article analyzes how blockchain technology enables acts that transgress the temporal, spatial, material, and subjective boundaries of the law, thereby introducing the notion of "alegality by design"—as the design of a technological artifact can provide affordances for alegality. Third, the article discusses how the law could respond to the alegality of blockchain technology through innovative policies encouraging the use of regulatory sandboxes to test for the "functional equivalence" and "regulatory equivalence" of the practices and processes implemented by blockchain initiatives.

International audience ; Blockchain technology was created as a response to the trust crisis that swept the world in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Bitcoin and other blockchain-based systems were presented as a "trustless" alternative to existing financial institutions and even governments. Yet, while the trustless nature of blockchain technology has been heavily questioned, little research has been done as to what blockchain technologies actually bring to the table in place of trust. This article draws from the extensive academic discussion on the concepts of "trust" and "confidence" to argue that blockchain technology is not a 'trustless technology' but rather a 'confidence machine'. First, the article provides a review of the multifaceted conceptualisations of trust and confidence, and the relationship between these two concepts. Second, the claim is made that blockchain technology relies on cryptographic rules, mathematics, and game-theoretical incentives in order to increase confidence in the operations of a computational system. Yet, such an increase in confidence ultimately relies on the proper operation and governance of the underlying blockchain-based network, which requires trusting a variety of actors. Third, the article turns to legal, constitutional and polycentric governance theory to explore the governance challenges of blockchain-based systems, in light of the tension between procedural confidence and trust.

International audience ; Blockchain technology was created as a response to the trust crisis that swept the world in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Bitcoin and other blockchain-based systems were presented as a "trustless" alternative to existing financial institutions and even governments. Yet, while the trustless nature of blockchain technology has been heavily questioned, little research has been done as to what blockchain technologies actually bring to the table in place of trust. This article draws from the extensive academic discussion on the concepts of "trust" and "confidence" to argue that blockchain technology is not a 'trustless technology' but rather a 'confidence machine'. First, the article provides a review of the multifaceted conceptualisations of trust and confidence, and the relationship between these two concepts. Second, the claim is made that blockchain technology relies on cryptographic rules, mathematics, and game-theoretical incentives in order to increase confidence in the operations of a computational system. Yet, such an increase in confidence ultimately relies on the proper operation and governance of the underlying blockchain-based network, which requires trusting a variety of actors. Third, the article turns to legal, constitutional and polycentric governance theory to explore the governance challenges of blockchain-based systems, in light of the tension between procedural confidence and trust.

First Online: 17 December 2018 ; The invention of Bitcoin in 2008 as a new type of electronic cash has arguably been one of the most radical financial innovations in the last decade. Recently, developer communities of blockchain technologies have started to turn their attention towards the issue of governance. The features of blockchain governance raise questions as to tensions that might arise between a strictly "on-chain" governance system and possible applications of "off-chain" governance. In this paper, we approach these questions by reflecting on a long-running debate in legal philosophy regarding the construction of a positivist legal order. First, we argue that on-chain governance shows striking similarities with Kelsen's notion of a positivist legal order, characterised by Schmitt as the machine that runs itself. Second, we illustrate some of the problems that emerged from the application of on-chain governance, with particular reference to a calamity in a blockchain-based system called the DAO. Third, we reflect on Schmitt's argument that the coalescence of private interests is a vulnerability of positivist legal systems, and accordingly posit this as an inherent vulnerability of on-chain governance of existing blockchain-based systems. ; This research is funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement No 716350) 'Global Citizenship Law'

This report presents a comprehensive proposal for a common ethics assessment framework for research and innovation (R&I) in the European Union member states. It details recommendations for good practices for ethics assessment, which includes the development of ethics assessment units and the protocols of these units. More specifically, the report presents a general toolkit for ethics assessment of R&I, as well as specialised tools and toolkits for specific types of organizations that deal with ethics assessment, and for different scientific fields. In addition, the report offers recommendations for the general institutional structure of ethics assessment in the EU and its member states. Due to the length of this report, a summary of its findings and recommendations is available. There are also several annexes that expand on particular sections of the report. These a nnexes are also available on the website of the SATORI project. In chapter 2, we analyse the stakeholders' expectations about the intended outcome of the SATORI project: a shared European framework for ethics assessment of R&I. This analysis is based on 153 interviews with different kind s of stakeholders, including both et hics assessors and non - assessors. Both benefits and obstacles were identified and are listed in this chapter. Furthermore, three main challenges are identified: the differences in ethics/values, the need for stakeholder buy - in, and the need for the ethics assessment framework to be a long - term process. Nonetheless, it is found that a significant majority of interviewees were positive or conditionally positive towards the desirability of a common approach to ethics assessment in R&I. In chapter 3, we propose a framework of ethical issues and principles, which are applicable to a broad array of types of scientific R&I. The research areas discussed in depth are the natural sciences, the engineering sciences, and the medical and life sciences, information and communication technology (ICT), Internet research, the social sciences, and the humanities. It provides a basis of ethical issues and principles that apply to all types of research. It also specifies the principles and issues that apply to specific research contexts. This chapter also includes a section on how potential conflicts between ethical principles may be resolved. In chapter 4, we outline recommendations for best practice in Ethics Assessment Units (EAUs). These recommendations are structured around a series of parameters common to all EAUs that review R&I activity. These parameters include the appropriate composition of an EAU, the appointment, training, and expertise of its members, the procedures for performing assessment, and how to assess the quality and efficiency of the EAU's work. The cultural and organisational factors that may affect the work of an EAU are also briefly considered. The chapter concludes with a summary of the recommendations presented within it. In chapter 5, we offer a short overview of the Common Framework for Ethical Impact Assessment (EIA) that is described further in Annex 1. This chapter can be used by governance bodies to set up new regulations with regard to ethics assessment in R&I , research funding organisations to set up new procedures for conducting EIAs in the projects they fund , and by local research organisations and companies for establishing internal procedures for conducting an EIA of the R&I projects they organise. In section 6, we present recommendations for specialised forms of ethics assessment and guidance. Specifically, we outline standards, tools and best practices for (1) policy - oriented assessment and guidance of new developments and practices in R&I (with a focus on governmental organisations, national ethics committees, and civil society organisations); (2) guiding, assessing and supporting ethical professional behaviour by scientists and innovators; an d (3) the ethics assessment of innovation and technology development plans. In chapter 7, we discuss ethics assessment (EA) and ethics guidance (EG) in the context of four specific types of organisation: universities, civil society organisations, industry and research funding organisations. In chapter 8, we outline proposals for the institutional structure of ethics assessment in eight types of organisations that perform ethics assessment in the EU member states: universities, national science academies, RFOs, RECs, NECs, academic and professional organisations, CSOs, and companies. In addition, we present recommendations for the institutionalisation of ethics assessment in selected European countries. I n chapter 9, we assess the compatibility of existing ethics assessment frameworks with the SATORI framework. This covers international regulations and guidelines as well as the approaches to ethics assessment in the United States and China. Finally, in chapter 10, we present a summary of the recommendations contained in this report, and conclude in chapter 11 with a list of the annexes to this report. ; May 19, 2017 (revised version), (Original report completed December 7, 2016), Deliverable D4.1