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This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths (N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths' social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.

This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths (N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths' social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.

This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths ( N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths' social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.

This cohort-sequential longitudinal study among 1302 Dutch youths examined the dynamics of political identity (e.g., Democrat or Rightist) and issue attitudes between age 12 and 30. Some theories propose that voters form an identity early in life that subsequently determines attitudes. Other theories contrarily argue that attitudes are a cause of identity. However, research on this controversy has never focused on the crucial phase of adolescence. Results revealed that youths formed an identity consistent with prior attitudes more than vice versa. Highly educated youths most often adjusted their attitudes to their identity, which explained an emerging education gap in identity-attitude consistency. Finally, findings suggested that early cultural attitudes establish an identity that may subsequently determine economic attitudes. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This three-wave cohort-sequential longitudinal study (N=1302) examined the development of two core political attitudes, economic egalitarianism and ethnocentrism, among Dutch youths between age 12 and 31. Longitudinal regression analyses revealed a curvilinear mean level development for both attitudes, reflecting an increased disagreement with economic redistribution and multiculturalism around late adolescence. Furthermore, attitudes became decreasingly polarized (i.e., less extreme) and increasingly stable with age. Finally, several effects of attitudes' correlates gradually changed: The effect of educational level on ethnocentrism increased with age, whereas the effect of gender diminished. Regional effects on ethnocentrism developed as youths resided in a new area. No age-related change was found in the effect of parental SES. Overall, these findings support the idea that attitudes mature during the formative phase of adolescence and that this process slows down during emerging adulthood. Furthermore, these results support developmental explanations for the association between attitudes and their correlates.

Conventional wisdom dictates that the more citizens lean towards either end of the ideological spectrum, the lower their support for democracy. The main model pitted against this "rigidity-of-the-extremes model" is the "rigidity-of-the-right model". This model assumes that rightist citizens are less supportive. This study proposes and empirically demonstrates the validity of an alternative model, which we call "the authoritarian legacy model". This model predicts that whether leftist or rightist citizens are less supportive of democracy depends on countries' experience with left- or right-authoritarianism. To evaluate its validity, we present a systematic comparative investigation of the relation between citizens' ideological and democratic beliefs, using European and World Values Survey data from 38 European countries (N = 105,495; 1994-2008). In line with this model, our analyses demonstrate that democratic support is lowest among leftist citizens in former left-authoritarian countries and among rightist citizens in former right-authoritarian countries. We find that this relation persists even among generations that grew up after authoritarian rule. These findings suggest that traditional ideological rigidity models are unsuitable for the study of citizens' democratic beliefs.

Das CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) legt den Schwerpunkt auf "the politics of populism", also auf Populismus. Es erforscht länderübergreifend den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Aufstieg von populistischen Parteien und der Verteilung von "populistischen" Einstellungen innerhalb der Bevölkerung. Hauptziel des Moduls ist es, die Auffassungen der BürgerInnen von politischen Eliten, gesellschaftlichen "Out-Groups" und nationaler Identität sowie die sich hieraus ergebenden Implikationen für repräsentative Demokratien zu analysieren. Die Daten erlauben es Forschenden somit, die Variation im Wettbewerb politischer Eliten und "populistischer" Einstellungen über Demokratien hinweg mit einzubeziehen, und zu untersuchen, wie solche Wahrnehmungen das Wahlverhalten von BürgerInnen beeinflussen.