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"Close presidential elections in the United States are measured, evaluated and remembered primarily by simple statistics. Why were the votes so close? What issues split the electorate? Was it the behavior or the reputation of the candidates? This book answers these questions and more, identifying and examining 12 of the closest elections from 1796 to 2000"--Provided by publisher

America's debt is in the trillions--and yet, like those who worry about borrowing five dollars but not about their unaffordable mortgage, Americans fail to pay attention to this serious situation. The press hovers over annual budgets and the associated deficits (and rare surpluses), but pays little attention to the national debt and even less to the interest spent serving it. Federal politicians seem as powerless to control the debt as they are uninformed about its nature. After tracing fluctuations in the finances of the country from its beginning until 1940, this book examines the administra

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American 'pivot,' and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly 'hedge' China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the 'Beijing Consensus' is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

International Relations theory about East Asia has increasingly argued that East Asia before Western penetration enjoyed a protracted peace. As explanations, a Chinese military hegemony would fit realist theory fairly well, while a cultural peace based on shared Confucian norms would be a significant anomaly. A Confucian Long Peace challenges widely held, albeit Eurocentric, realist presumptions including the perils of anarchy, the arms-racing and misperception of the security dilemma, and the regularity of power balancing. This article therefore investigates, first, whether such a peace did in fact exist, and, second, whether this might be attributed to Confucianism. A cultural peace theory requires a strong anti-war cultural norm and a shared sense of community. Skepticism is established by examining three comparative cultural spaces that nonetheless did not enjoy a culturally informed peace: the classical Greek city-state system, early modern Christendom, and the contemporary Arab state system. All were deeply riven and competitive. Nevertheless, empirical investigation of the last Chinese (Qing) dynasty before the Western arrival (1644-1839) demonstrates that it was remarkably peaceful toward its Confucian neighbors, while more 'normally' exploiting its power asymmetry against non-Confucian ones. Process-tracing specialized Chinese practices toward fellow Confucians suggests that the low Confucian war finding emanates from cultural restraint. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

International Relations theory about East Asia has increasingly argued that East Asia before Western penetration enjoyed a protracted peace. As explanations, a Chinese military hegemony would fit realist theory fairly well, while a cultural peace based on shared Confucian norms would be a significant anomaly. A Confucian Long Peace challenges widely held, albeit Eurocentric, realist presumptions including the perils of anarchy, the arms-racing and misperception of the security dilemma, and the regularity of power balancing. This article therefore investigates, first, whether such a peace did in fact exist, and, second, whether this might be attributed to Confucianism. A cultural peace theory requires a strong anti-war cultural norm and a shared sense of community. Skepticism is established by examining three comparative cultural spaces that nonetheless did not enjoy a culturally informed peace: the classical Greek city-state system, early modern Christendom, and the contemporary Arab state system. All were deeply riven and competitive. Nevertheless, empirical investigation of the last Chinese (Qing) dynasty before the Western arrival (1644–1839) demonstrates that it was remarkably peaceful toward its Confucian neighbors, while more 'normally' exploiting its power asymmetry against non-Confucian ones. Process-tracing specialized Chinese practices toward fellow Confucians suggests that the low Confucian war finding emanates from cultural restraint.

The response of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to the pressure of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is undertheorized. Scholarship on NGOs around IGOs is frequently idiosyncratic and laudatory, and we lack cumulation for cross-IGO generalizations about NGO impact within the frame of established international relations (IR) theory. From the central three IR paradigms (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) I elaborate a null and three alternative hypotheses to explain why an IGO would respond to NGO pressures. I benchmark these hypotheses to empirical indicators of NGO impact on IGOs. I then 'test drive' this framework against the highly relevant, easily cross-comparable Bretton Woods Institutions. I find that the World Bank responds functionally to NGO pressure: NGO outreach serves its mission efficiency. The International Monetary Fund responds defensively: NGOs are an organizational threat to be managed.