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SummaryIn the last decade, the human rights accountability movement has made remarkable inroads into the classical law of immunities. The developments strike a new equilibrium between the need to promote accountability and the need to protect international discourse. These developments form a coherent picture if one looks to the underlying rationales of these areas of law. Immunities ratione materiae, enjoyed by current and former officials, protect official functions on behalf of a state. The landmark Pinochet decision affirmed that official functions could not include the commission of international crimes condemned by international law. Conversely, immunity ratione personae flows from a different rationale. This form of immunity protects only certain high officials representing their state and only during office and facilitates official visits by precluding arrest on any grounds. The International Court of Justice Yerodia decision and other developments confirm that this immunity remains absolute, irrespective of the conduct alleged. However, even this absolute immunity may be relinquished through Security Council enforcement action or acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

On July 17, 1998, the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome Conference) adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of the many significant provisions of the ICC statute is Article 7, which defines "crimes against humanity" for the purpose of the ICC. A significant difference between the definition in the ICC statute and the major precedents on crimes against humanity is that the former definition was not imposed by victors (as were those in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters) or by the Security Council (as were those in the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals). In contrast, Article 7 was developed through multilateral negotiations involving 160 states. For this reason, one could reasonably expect Article 7 to be more detailed than previous definitions, given the interest of participating states in knowing the precise contours of the corresponding obligations they would be undertaking. For the same reason, one might expect the definition to be more restrictive than previous definitions. Fortunately, although the definition in the ICC statute is more detailed than previous definitions, it generally seems to reflect most of the positive developments identified in recent authorities. For example, the definition does not require any nexus to armed conflict, does not require proof of a discriminatory motive, and recognizes the crime of apartheid and enforced disappearance as inhumane acts.

SummaryNineteen ninety-seven was marked by several important developments at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. A series of arrests and voluntary surrenders have increased the Tribunal's workload and credibility. The landmark Tadic judgment has clarified international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to crimes against humanity. The Erdemovic decision considered the defence of duress with respect to the murder of civilians and the use ofguilty pleas in international criminal law. Finally, the Blaskic decision has considered the use of subpoenas in international law.

We are delighted to participate in this symposium on the legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (Tribunals; respectively, ICTY and ICTR). We have been asked to offer reflections on the Tribunals' impact on substantive international criminal law (ICL)—in particular, the definitions of crimes and the modes of liability. Given the enormity of the topic, we can offer only a cursory and impressionist sketch of the terrain, and draw attention to a few intriguing features along the way. We will not attempt to survey the Tribunals' jurisprudence or the related academic literature. Instead, our aim is simply to highlight three themes underlying the Tribunals' elaboration of substantive legal standards. For the nonspecialist, this sketch may provide a helpful overview of the evolution of ICL. For the specialist, this sketch may bring into slightly sharper relief some underlying patterns in the Tribunals' work. We will also offer some broader thoughts about the Tribunals in the overall arc of ICL, and how their structure and priorities have left a lasting, distinctive imprimatur on ICL.

The development of rules governing non-international, or internal, armed conflicts has long been characterized by a profound tension between concerns of sovereignty and concerns of humanity. Historically, strong sovereignty-oriented interests dictated a slow and cautious pace of progress in this sensitive area. In recent years, however, a growing humanitarian concern for the protection of victims has prompted rapid developments in the regulation of internal armed conflict. This transformation has been greatly assisted by the establishment of the twoad hocTribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by the Security Council, in 1993 and 1994 respectively, and the operation of these bodies. Clear trends in this area include not only the articulation and recognition of a growing body of norms applicable in internal armed conflicts but also the expanding criminalization of violations of those norms. In a world where most armed conflicts are of a non-international character, these developments are of the greatest significance.From 15 June to 17 July 1998, delegations from 160 countries assembled in Rome to negotiate and adopt a Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC), with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

In the past twenty years, international criminal law has become one of the main areas of international legal scholarship and practice. Most textbooks in the field describe the evolution of international criminal tribunals, the elements of the core international crimes, the applicable modes of liability and defences, and the role of states in prosecuting international crimes. The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, however, takes a theoretically informed and refreshingly critical look at the most controversial issues in international criminal law, challenging prevailing practices, orthodoxies, and received wisdoms. Some of the contributions to the Handbook come from scholars within the field, but many come from outside of international criminal law, or indeed from outside law itself. The chapters are grounded in history, geography, philosophy, and international relations. The result is a Handbook that expands the discipline and should fundamentally alter how international criminal law is understood.