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Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.

I argue that the economic success of Botswana can be explained by the historical development of its institutions which is related to the trajectory of the Tswana states over the past 200 years. These institutions created a much more stable and accountable government than elsewhere in Africa after independence with the desire and incentive to adopt good economic policies. There are two main lessons from this experience. The first is how successful an African economy can become using simple orthodox well-understood policies. The second is that successful development in Africa will be helped by a focus on the development of state institutions. Though Botswana inherited different institutions from elsewhere, it also built on these, in particular trying to create a national identity and to continually modernize and adapt institutions. There are many lessons for other African countries from these policy choices.

▪ Abstract  In this essay, I review recent research on the effects of economic development on democracy. On the theoretical side, for the first time there has been a systematic attempt to bring the types of formal models developed by economists and political scientists outside of comparative politics to bear on the origins of democracy. I present a simple analytical framework that captures some of the results in this literature. On the empirical side, the issue of identifying causal relationships in the data is finally receiving attention. However, the application of techniques adopted from best-practice econometrics shows no evidence that economic development has a causal effect on democracy. Neither does it support the idea that economic development influences the probability of coups but not democratizations. More likely, and in line with the model I develop, income per capita and democracy are correlated because the same features of a society simultaneously determine how prosperous and how democratic it is. There is still a lot to learn on this topic.

In this essay, I review recent research on the effects of economic development on democracy. On the theoretical side, for the first time there has been a systematic attempt to bring the types of formal models developed by economists & political scientists outside of comparative politics to bear on the origins of democracy. I present a simple analytical framework that captures some of the results in this literature. On the empirical side, the issue of identifying causal relationships in the data is finally receiving attention. However, the application of techniques adopted from best-practice econometrics shows no evidence that economic development has a causal effect on democracy. Neither does it support the idea that economic development influences the probability of coups but not democratizations. More likely, & in line with the model I develop, income per capita & democracy are correlated because the same features of a society simultaneously determine how prosperous & how democratic it is. There is still a lot to learn on this topic. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Explores the Mar 2004 referenda in Taiwan, held the same day as the closely contested presidential election, through a study of the origins of the referenda, criteria included in the Referendum Act, Central Election Commission participation, & the significance of the outcomes. Skeptics believed that the referenda were introduced with ulterior motives tied to the presidential election & encouraged their followers to boycott the referenda, but with 80% of the votes cast supporting the referenda, the results may embolden President Chen Shui-bian to revise & expand the referendum legislation. The author concludes that past experience in America proves that legislatures systematically avoid responding to results of initiatives, & the results will probably be similar in Taiwan. 1 Table. L. A. Hoffman

Good economic institutions promote prosperity. Yet bad institutions can persist because they induce patterns of distribution that benefit certain groups, which accordingly have a vested interest in the status quo. In Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (1999), Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman show how politicians in Russia used a specific kind of deal, a mixture of expropriation & co-optation, to destroy these vested interests in the transition to a market economy. In this essay, I show that there are close analogies between institutional change in contemporary Russia, & that which occurred in 19th-century Latin America, particularly in Mexico during the Porfiriato. After developing the analogy I draw some conclusions from the Mexican experience for the long-run implications of Shleifer-Treisman deals. The good news is that sustained economic growth is possible with the institutions that Russia seems to have developed. The bad news is that these may lead to extreme social conflict & ultimately revolution. I argue that there are two mitigating factors in Russia that provide grounds for optimism that revolution may be avoided. First, Russia is a democracy; second, the role of foreign investment is limited. 20 References. Adapted from the source document.