Suchergebnisse

Se describe cómo ha sido el desarrollo de la urbanización en Costa Rica en los últimos años y cuáles han sido las pocas acciones planificadas efectuadas al respecto. Se analiza algunos conceptos referentes a la "ciudad deseable" que los paradigmas urbanísticos modernos ofrecen y el cómo alcanzarla. Se describe algunas políticas impulsadas en los últimos 20 años en la Gran Área Metropolitana (Gam), empezando por el Plan Gam, de 1982, y se releva algunos conceptos de éste retomados en las fases I y II del –en progreso- Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano. Se expone la propuesta en gestación del Proyecto Regional Urbano de la Gam. Finalmente, se presenta recomendaciones tendientes al logro de ciudades más humanas, competitivas y con más alta calidad de vida. ; It is described how has been the urbanization development in Costa Rica in the last years and which has been the few planned actions towards that. It is analyzed some concepts referred to the "desirable city" that modern urbanistic paradigms offer, and how to reach it. It is described some politics impulsed in last twenty years in the Great Metropolitan Area (GAM), beginning with Gam Plan, from 1982, and some concepts that are replaced from this, taken from phases I and II of the –in progress- Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (National Plan of Urban Development). It is exposed the proposal in gestation of the Regional Urban Project of the GAM. Finally, recommendations are presented along the lines of a accomplishment of more human cities, more competitive and with a higher life quality.

This paper presents a non‐median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent‐seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.