Suchergebnisse

This collection seeks to ground political theory in the study of institutions, particularly the constitutional relationship between different branches of government. It makes the case that 'constitutionalism' has become a thin doctrine of political restraint. Waldron wants to identify a fuller conceptual understanding of how the functions of government can be empowered and articulated. In doing so, he sets out a position that is distinct from both moralism and realism in contemporary political theory. I explore how well the later distinction holds up: how successfully does Waldron's approach marry realist concerns with the rigour of analytical political theory? I also discuss the role it leaves for the history of political thought and whether it can deal with the populist strain in contemporary politics.

The referendum result, David Runciman suggests, was won by those who feel excluded from modern, highly networked forms of economy and society. The tragedy, he argues, is that the elites on the losing side will be able – and likely – to respond not by re‐engaging with national politics but by distancing themselves even further from it.

Throughout almost the entire history of democracy—from pre-Socratic Greece up to the second half of the twentieth century—its champions faced little difficulty in identifying its enemies. Critics of democracy consistently lined up to attack it on ideological and philosophical grounds. The litany of complaints was familiar: Democracy is an ignorant, unreliable, unstable form of rule; putting power in the hands of the people entrusts decision-making to those who are incapable of making the right decisions, either because of their natural incapacity or because social arrangements have denuded them of their ability to know what they are doing; democratic politicians pander to the masses, and the masses reward them for it; democracies choose short-term gratification over long-term solutions and eventually pay the price. These charges were invariably accompanied by the promise of something better, the assumption being that almost any alternative regime would be an improvement on the inadequacies of democracy.

The IT revolution is transforming politics and opening up a new dimension of inequality. The Labour party can be as technologically savvy as it likes, argues David Runciman, but it cannot become a vote‐winning machine again until it sets out a role for the state in the political economy of the digital age.

Today's politicians start and exit politics younger; they lack heft, stature and outside interests; they are bred into an ever‐narrower political class; and they preside over tame and depleted political parties. Should we be waiting for another Churchill, asks David Runciman, or are we measuring today's politicians against the wrong yardsticks?

'Crises can transform politics; scandals rarely do.' Drawing a contrast with the ructions of the 1970s, David Runciman argues that British democracy is suffering from a permanent state of scandal which obscures the underlying crisis of elitist managerial politics.

The success story of democracy over the twentieth century has given way to doubts in the twenty‐first, as democracies struggle to cope with difficult wars, mounting debts, climate change and the rise of China. This essay uses intellectual history to explain the link between long‐term democratic success and short‐term democratic failure. It distinguishes three distinct views of what can go wrong with democracy, and identifies the third (which I call 'the confidence trap', an idea that originates with Tocqueville) as the key to understanding our present predicament. Democratic success creates blind spots and a reluctance to tackle long‐term problems. I use this idea to explain and put in context Fukuyama's claims about the end of history, and to examine the link between democratic failure and market failure.

Der Autor rezensiert das Buch von Richard Wilkinson / Kate Pickett: "Gleichheit ist Glück. Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind" (2009). Die These dieses provozierenden Buches lässt sich folgendermaßen zusammenfassen: Unter den reichen Ländern schneiden die ungleicheren bei fast allen Indikatoren zur Lebensqualität schlechter ab als die egalitäreren. Sie schneiden selbst dann schlechter ab, wenn sie insgesamt reicher sind, so dass sich das Bruttoinlandsprodukt pro Kopf der Bevölkerung als erheblich weniger aussagekräftig für das allgemeine Wohlergehen erweist als die Größe der Kluft zwischen den reichsten und den ärmsten 20% der Bevölkerung Das zur Begründung dieser These vorgelegte Beweismaterial anhand zahlreicher statistischer Diagramme ist überwältigend. Ob die These nun anhand der Lebenserwartung, der Säuglingssterblichkeit, den Fettleibigkeits- und Kriminalitätsraten, der Lese-Schreib-Kompetenz oder der Menge des recycelten Abfalls überprüft wird, ausnahmslos ist das Ergebnis umso besser, je egalitärer die betreffende Gesellschaft ist. Warum erscheint einem das Buch jedoch trotz der bündigen Argumentation, der Überzeugungskraft der Belege und der unverkennbar pragmatischen Zielsetzung der Verfasser merkwürdig utopisch? Dies liegt nach Ansicht des Autors teilweise daran, dass die These nicht so eindeutig ist, wie es Richard Wilkinson und Kate Pickett gerne hätten. Obwohl sie ganz offensichtlich von ihrer These überzeugt sind, manipulieren sie in entscheidenden Momenten das Hauptproblem, während sie bei anderer Gelegenheit übers Ziel hinausschießen, was ihrem Thema keineswegs dient. (ICI2)

A review essay on books by (1) Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 2006); & (2) Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 2008).