Suchergebnisse

This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on why states ratify human rights treaties. It first analyses why Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States did not initially ratify or accede to the 1948 Genocide Convention, and then explores why the three countries eventually did accept it, 20–40 years after it was approved by the United Nations General Assembly. The extent to which material costs and benefits, the logic of appropriateness, and acculturation played a role in each of the three cases is assessed. Acculturation is particularly evident in the Irish case, but it also helps to explain the UK and US acceptance of the Convention.

The European Union should be well-placed to exercise influence at the United Nations, as it is endowed with many material and ideational power resources that could enable it to win approval for its positions and proposals. Yet it encountered hostility when it sought enhanced observer status in the General Assembly and it has often been isolated at the Human Rights Council. The EU's failures to translate its putative power resources into influence in international affairs are often attributed to a lack of unity within the EU, but even when the EU is united at the UN, it may not win support. To help explain why, this article focuses on the UN as a locus of the international politics of legitimization, where UN Member States seek approval for their positions and policies, and base their appeals for support on competing principles and values.