Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the relationship between the bundling decision of a large firm and the impact of spillovers from smaller firms drawing on stylized facts from the software industry. We find that bundling occurs only in the presence of significant spillovers from the two smaller firms. The large firm does not bundle when there are spillovers for only one product. Finally, we show that welfare is higher under bundling.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Contributors -- 1 The Political Economy of Corruption: Some New Perspectives -- 2 The Political Economy of Corruption: On the Link Between Corruption Control and Cronyism -- Corruption Control: Promise and Practice -- How Corruption Control May Exacerbate Corruption: A Model -- Corruption and Policy -- Acknowledgment -- Notes -- References -- 3 Corruption, Institutional Trust and Legitimacy: A Vicious Circle -- Introduction -- The Importance of Trust -- Corruption and Trust -- Trust, Corruption and Compliance -- The Legitimacy Trap in Anti-Corruption Reforms -- Breaking Out of the Legitimacy Trap in Anti-Corruption Reforms -- Conclusion -- References -- 4 Legal Systems and Corruption -- Introduction -- Legal Origins and Corruption -- The Model -- Equilibrium Analysis -- Model With Bribery -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 5 Corruption and Optimal Enforcement -- Introduction -- The Enforcement Problem -- Corruption: Collusion -- Dilution -- Preventing Collusion -- Corruption: Extortion and Harassment -- Fighting Extortion -- Overenforcement? -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 6 A Theory of Joint Evolution of Corruption and Growth -- Introduction -- The Environment -- To Be Or Not to Be Corrupt -- Corruption, Tax Rate, Rate of Return and Capital Dynamics -- Case 1: Absence of Corruption -- Case 2: Full Prevalence of Corruption -- The Joint Evolution of Corruption and Growth -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 7 Corruption and the Financial Sector: An Examination of the Literature -- Introduction -- The Literature -- Sand the Wheels Hypothesis -- Government Ownership of Banks -- Regulation, Intervention and Lack of Supervision -- Insider Trading and Risk-Taking Behaviour -- Non-performing Loans -- Political Connections.

AbstractWe propose a method for incorporating multiple linguistic or soft variables into a system dynamics framework. A simple example is used to illustrate the procedures necessary to define linguistic variables using triangular membership functions within the VENSIM Simulation Environment. We illustrate the operations of linguistic variables through a sales and service model where two linguistic variables, i.e. customer's satisfaction with respect to service, and lead time associated with a product, impact the conversion of potential customers into customers. After having created fuzzy triangular membership functions, we obtain the combined effect of the two linguistic variables using the max–min inference procedure. For defuzzification we use the notion of the largest of maximum to translate the fuzzy representation of the combined effect into a crisp value. Finally, we provide simulation results pertaining to the probability of generating new customers and profits by considering pessimistic, optimistic and intermediate fuzzy rules for our model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.