Suchergebnisse

In the 1920 and early 1930s, the German semi-synthetic fibre industry was dominated by a duopoly of two big players. The incumbent firms were not willing to expand their staple fibre capacities to the extent demanded by the new Nazi government, which prepared for autarky and war. Hence the government encouraged other private companies, especially spinning mills, to found eight regional staple fibre plants and protected them against the incumbents who were technologically superior. The Nazis' infant company protection policy enabled the ­newcomers to become competitive both in economic and technological terms within a few years. After the war and without protection, these firms flourished on the world market. While the big players left the market, two of the newcomers founded in the second half of the 1930s are today the last European producers of staple fibre. We analyse in detail why companies founded for protectionist reasons by a non-benign government became successful firms competing on the world market. ; publishedVersion

This article analyses how Nazi Germany exploited France, which – from an economic point of view – was the most important occupied country during the Second World War. We can show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there was no clear-cut caesura in Germany's policy of exploiting occupied France – not in the extent of the exploitation in real terms or in the kind of policy toward occupation funds. Although the war in the East and preparations for the invasion made it necessary for Germany to reduce wasteful spending of occupation funds and combat French inflation more consistently, its occupation policy did not shift radically but gradually between mid 1942 and the end of 1943. However, it was not Albert Speer's Armament Ministry, but other German institutions, especially the Reich Finance Ministry, which played a decisive role in this process. Without this policy Germany would not have been able to increase the French contribution to the German warfare all over Europe, especially on the Eastern front.

Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of contract options to choose from. There were several motives behind this attitude of the regime, among them the conviction that private property provided important incentives for increasing efficiency.

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm‐level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning‐by‐doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.

Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941. This paper uses the annual audit reports of the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand AG for seven firms which together represented about 50 % of the German aircraft producers. We question the received view by showing that in the German aircraft industry the crucial changes that triggered the upswing in aircraft production already occurred before World War II. The government decided in 1938 that aircraft producers had to concentrate on a few different types, and in 1937 that cost-plus contracts were replaced with fixed price contracts. What followed was not a sudden production miracle but a continuous development which was fuelled first by learning-by-doing and then by the ongoing growth of the capital and labor endowment.

Der Band bietet ein Kompendium zur deutschen Wirtschaft unter dem Nationalsozialismus unter Einschluss der Kriegsperiode und der Besatzungswirtschaft. Wirtschaftsgeschichte wird in einem umfassenden Sinne verstanden, d. h. es werden auch Themenfelder wie Sozial-, Arbeitsmarkt- und Umweltpolitik oder Wissenschafts- und Konsumgeschichte einbezogen. Ausführliche Kapitel widmen sich dem Kern der bisherigen Forschung: Rüstung, Industriebranchen, Landwirtschaft, Außenwirtschaft und Wirtschaftslenkung. Daneben werden Bereiche wie Tourismus, Medien oder Luxusgüter behandelt. In vielen Kapiteln findet das Thema der Vernichtung wirtschaftlicher Existenzen einen Platz. Forschungserkenntnisse der vergangenen Jahre, insbesondere auch aus den umfangreichen Forschungsprojekten zur Geschichte deutscher Institutionen und Ministerien im Nationalsozialismus, werden in einen größeren Rahmen eingebettet. Eine solch facettenreiche Behandlung der NS-Wirtschaftsgeschichte in einem Werk ist eine Neuheit auf dem Büchermarkt. Der Band richtet sich an alle Interessierten, die Informationen über die Wirkungen der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie auf wirtschaftliche Prozesse suchen. Der Band ist sowohl in der schulischen als auch der universitären Lehre einzusetzen, kann aber auch als Einstieg für weiterreichende oder detailliertere Forschungen dienen.

Der Band bietet ein Kompendium zur deutschen Wirtschaft unter dem Nationalsozialismus unter Einschluss der Kriegsperiode und der Besatzungswirtschaft. Wirtschaftsgeschichte wird in einem umfassenden Sinne verstanden, d. h. es werden auch Themenfelder wie Sozial-, Arbeitsmarkt- und Umweltpolitik oder Wissenschafts- und Konsumgeschichte einbezogen. Ausführliche Kapitel widmen sich dem Kern der bisherigen Forschung: Rüstung, Industriebranchen, Landwirtschaft, Außenwirtschaft und Wirtschaftslenkung. Daneben werden Bereiche wie Tourismus, Medien oder Luxusgüter behandelt. In vielen Kapiteln findet das Thema der Vernichtung wirtschaftlicher Existenzen einen Platz. Forschungserkenntnisse der vergangenen Jahre, insbesondere auch aus den umfangreichen Forschungsprojekten zur Geschichte deutscher Institutionen und Ministerien im Nationalsozialismus, werden in einen größeren Rahmen eingebettet. Eine solch facettenreiche Behandlung der NS-Wirtschaftsgeschichte in einem Werk ist eine Neuheit auf dem Büchermarkt. Der Band richtet sich an alle Interessierten, die Informationen über die Wirkungen der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie auf wirtschaftliche Prozesse suchen. Der Band ist sowohl in der schulischen als auch der universitären Lehre einzusetzen, kann aber auch als Einstieg für weiterreichende oder detailliertere Forschungen dienen