Suchergebnisse

Much of the literature of policy analysis and public administration is dominated by incremental and "divisible goods" paradigms. Policy is assumed to be a process of marginal and adjustive decision making in which benefits are dispensed piecemeal—proportionate to prevailing distributions of power or publicized need. This essay asserts the existence of a class of nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuits for which the analytical weaponry of political science is largely inappropriate. Such policies display a distinctive set of political and administrative characteristics. These characteristics are explained and examined in connection with manned space exploration policy. An assessment is offered of the challenges posed by nonincremental policy to contemporary outlooks in political science.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Major acronyms -- Chapter 1. The infrastructure society -- Chapter 2. The interinfrastructure challenge -- Chapter 3. High reliability in critical infrastructures -- Chapter 4. A framework for icis reliability management -- Chapter 5. A framework for icis risk management -- Chapter 6. Our framework in a comparative analytic perspective -- Chapter 7. The full cycle of infrastructure operations -- Chapter 8. Managing interconnected control variables: a case of electricity and water -- Chapter 9. Interinfrastructural innovation and its control room impacts: a case study of caiso and mrtu -- Chapter 10. Interconnected infrastructure systems as a complex policy problem -- Chapter 11. Toward multiple reliability standards for interconnected infrastructure systems -- Appendix. Research methods -- Notes -- References -- Index

AbstractTo aid in their safety oversight of large‐scale, potentially dangerous energy and water infrastructure and transportation systems, public utility regulatory agencies increasingly seek to use formal risk assessment models. Yet some of the approaches to risk assessment used by utilities and their regulators may be less useful for this purpose than is supposed. These approaches often do not reflect the current state of the art in risk assessment strategy and methodology. This essay explores why utilities and regulatory agencies might embrace risk assessment techniques that do not sufficiently assess organizational and managerial factors as drivers of risk, nor that adequately represent important uncertainties surrounding risk calculations. Further, it describes why, in the special legal, political, and administrative world of the typical public utility regulator, strategies to identify and mitigate formally specified risks might actually diverge from the regulatory promotion of "safety." Some improvements are suggested that can be made in risk assessment approaches to support more fully the safety oversight objectives of public regulatory agencies, with examples from "high‐reliability organizations" (HROs) that have successfully merged the management of safety with the management of risk. Finally, given the limitations of their current risk assessments and the lessons from HROs, four specific assurances are suggested that regulatory agencies should seek for themselves and the public as objectives in their safety oversight of public utilities.

After the demise of the space shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board sharply criticized NASA's safety culture. Adopting the high‐reliability organization as a benchmark, the board concluded that NASA did not possess the organizational characteristics that could have prevented this disaster. Furthermore, the board determined that high‐reliability theory is "extremely useful in describing the culture that should exist in the human spaceflight organization." In this article, we argue that this conclusion is based on a misreading and misapplication of high‐reliability research. We conclude that in its human spaceflight programs, NASA has never been, nor could it be, a high‐reliability organization. We propose an alternative framework to assess reliability and safety in what we refer to as reliability‐seeking organizations.

This research note summarizes observed similarities, differences, and mixed similarities and differences between emergency responders in California's emergency response infrastructure and control room operators in some other critical infrastructures there. The dissimilarities are all the more striking given the many similarities. The chief difference, we speculate, lies in the conditions on and skills of control room operators to ensure the continuous and safe provision of the critical service in question, even during (especially during) turbulent times – what we have called 'high reliability management'. This management differs considerably from the active crisis management of many emergency responders, although both groups seek to manage 'reliably'.