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This book presents eleven classic papers by the late Professor Suzanne Scotchmer with introductions by leading economists and legal scholars. This book introduces Scotchmer's life and work; analyses her pioneering contributions to the economics of patents and innovation incentives, with a special focus on the modern theory of cumulative innovation; and describes her pioneering work on law and economics, evolutionary game theory, and general equilibrium/club theory. This book also provides a self-contained introduction to students who want to learn more about the various fields that Professor Scotchmer worked in, with a particular focus on patent incentives and cumulative innovation

This book presents eleven classic papers by the late Professor Suzanne Scotchmer with introductions by leading economists and legal scholars. This book introduces Scotchmer's life and work; analyses her pioneering contributions to the economics of patents and innovation incentives, with a special focus on the modern theory of cumulative innovation; and describes her pioneering work on law and economics, evolutionary game theory, and general equilibrium/club theory. This book also provides a self-contained introduction to students who want to learn more about the various fields that Professor Scotchmer worked in, with a particular focus on patent incentives and cumulative innovation

Patents differ from other forms of intellectual property in that independent invention is not a defence to infringement. We argue that the patent rule is inferior in any industry where the cost of independently inventing a product is not too much less than (no less than half) the inventor's cost. First, the threat of entry by independent invention would induce patent holders to license the technology, lowering the market price. Second, a defence of independent invention would reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D effort that occurs in patent races. In either case, the threat of independent invention creates a mechanism that limits patent‐holders' profits to levels commensurate with their costs of R&D.