Suchergebnisse

This article discusses one principal challenge to detention without trial of suspected international terrorists—the international human rights law (IHRL) norm requiring the introduction of an upper limit on the duration of security detention in order to render it not indefinite in length. Part One of this article describes the "hardline" position on security detention, adopted by the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks (followed, with certain variations, by other countries, including the United Kingdom and the State of Israel), according to which international terrorism suspects can be deprived of their liberty without trial for the duration of the armed conflict in which the organizations they are affiliated with participate. Part Two describes judicial and quasi-judicial challenges to the "hardline" position, and Part Three addresses recent developments in IHRL relating to the co-application of IHL and IHRL and the extra-territoriality of certain IHRL norms, and specifically discusses developments relating to the application of IHRL norms governing security detentions. Part Four concludes by offering an IHRL-based perspective to security detention policy and, in particular, to aspects of the policy leading to de facto indefinite detention.

Abstract
International human rights law (IHRL) has struggled to define a standard for determining the extraterritorial applicability of its norms that would reconcile the ethos of universal entitlement, on the one hand, with the centrality of borders in delineating state powers and responsibilities under international law, on the other hand. The case law of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) favors barring states from engaging in conduct outside their borders that would be impermissible if undertaken inside their borders. Still, attempts to demarcate the precise scope of extraterritorial application through allusion to degrees of control over individuals or areas, or by the nature of the obligation itself – have led to unsatisfactory, if not arbitrary results. This article opines a move to functionalism as the basis for extraterritorial applicability – requiring states to protect IHRL in situations they can do so. Under this approach, which takes universality seriously, borders lose much their normative significance. I suggest limiting the functional approach to extraterritorial applicability in accordance with two key notions: (1) the intensity of power relations – factual relations of power entailing direct, significant and foreseeable potential impact – should result in the application of IHRL obligations; or, alternatively, (2) special legal relations – relations of power that put the state in a unique legal position to afford IHRL protection would also justify the imposition of extraterritorial obligations.