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Intellectual efforts to understand post-Crimean Russian society have brought to prominence explanations that emphasize psychological and attitudinal legacies of Soviet society. The recent revival of the term homo sovieticus (or Soviet man) in the media and intellectual discourse is a good illustration of this trend. Yurii Levada's late-Soviet sociological research project on the "simple Soviet man" serves as a frequent reference point in these discussions. In this article, I explore the ideological and analytical foundations of the Levada project and juxtapose the sociological construct developed by Levada and his team with the interpretative approach developed by Natalya Kozlova, another Soviet scholar who dedicated her life to studying Soviet society. I argue that essentialist and deterministic views of individual personality underpinning the Levada project that guide the current use of the Soviet man category are more politically and ideologically driven rather than being based on the state of the art in social psychology.

This study uses the 2011 BEEPS survey for the Russian Federation to study factors influencing corruption perceptions in Russian regions. Specifically, the analysis relies on Henry Hale's theory of patronal presidentialism to explore the effects of the institutional environment and, particularly, of regional political uncertainty, on the perceptions of economic actors embedded in it. The analysis reveals that political instability – when measured by the recent political turnover in the region and the presence of regional inter-elite conflicts – works to increase corruption perceptions among economic actors. These findings support earlier literature on the importance of informal rules and 'insider entrepreneurship' in Russia.

This study uses the 2011 BEEPS survey for the Russian Federation to study factors influencing corruption perceptions in Russian regions. Specifically, the analysis relies on Henry Hale's theory of patronal presidentialism to explore the effects of the institutional environment and, particularly, of regional political uncertainty, on the perceptions of economic actors embedded in it. The analysis reveals that political instability - when measured by the recent political turnover in the region and the presence of regional inter-elite conflicts - works to increase corruption perceptions among economic actors. These findings support earlier literature on the importance of informal rules and 'insider entrepreneurship' in Russia.

This study focuses on the regional effects of new domestic and foreign policies initiated by Russia's president and the challenging policy dilemmas faced by regional governors since 2012. It analyzes gubernatorial elections held during 2012–2015 to show the increased control over the electoral process and the regional cadre exercised by the Kremlin. It explores the implications of new identity politics and foreign policies advanced from Moscow on regional elites' place in Russia's system of power, their governance strategies and political economies. It reviews regional adjustment strategies undertaken in response to Russia's rising economic problems.

This study focuses on the regional effects of new domestic and foreign policies initiated by Russia's president and the challenging policy dilemmas faced by regional governors since 2012. It analyzes gubernatorial elections held during 2012-2015 to show the increased control over the electoral process and the regional cadre exercised by the Kremlin. It explores the implications of new identity politics and foreign policies advanced from Moscow on regional elites' place in Russia's system of power, their governance strategies and political economies. It reviews regional adjustment strategies undertaken in response to Russia's rising economic problems.

This study argues for the need to better integrate the role of international factors, specifically global financial institutions, in order to understand the roots of institutional failures in some post-communist countries, including Russia. It explores the differential nature of policy challenges facing Western democracies and authoritarian regimes regarding their participation in the globalized financial system.

Russlands Regionalregierungen spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Stabilität des Landes. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die wichtigsten Strategien der Regierung der Republik Tatarstan, mit denen die Auswirkungen der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise auf die verschiedenen Industrien und Branchen der Republik abgefedert werden sollen.

Contributing to the literature on authoritarian elite management, this study explores a puzzle concerned with the elite evolution in Russia's two ethnic republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The variation of political legacies left by these two republics' first presidents cannot be addressed using mainstream explanations that are usually considered principal for the Kremlin's decisionmaking on gubernatorial cadres in Russia. Both Rakhimov and Shaimiev were very successful as political bosses who could effectively deliver electoral votes to the Kremlin and maintain relative social and economic stability within their republics. Yet, toward the end of their political careers, they faced different degrees of freedom in their negotiations with federal elites and had varying degrees of success in ensuring political and economic continuity within their republics. The study instead focuses on the legacies of republican privatization and the institutional dynamics of patronal presidentialism as two alternative explanations for their divergent political outcomes.

This essay brings attention to the recent discursive turn in Russian politics that is reflected in the Kremlin's turn to issues of traditional values and morality. Expressed in Russia's domestic and foreign policies, this new "morality politics" is dated by the Pussy Riot trial in 2012 that the Kremlin used to advance its new discursive frame in the public sphere. Although not entirely new in its orientation, this new stage of "morality politics" differs from the earlier policy initiatives in its intensity, scope and political significance for the regime. The moralizing stance taken by the regime is accompanied by a divide and rule political tactic, whereby the establishment has tried to marginalize the protesters from the rest of the Russian public that the regime is attempting to reconsolidate based on traditional, conservative values. The essay interprets this recent morality turn as a strategy selected by the Kremlin to restore the regime's legitimacy that has been shaken by the protests of 2011–2012 and looks at the social and political consequences of the selected strategy.

Why did Russian governors unexpectedly acquiesce to centralizing reforms undertaken by Vladimir Putin? Interviews with regional and central politicians and an analysis of speeches during 1990–2009 reveal that interests alone cannot account for the presence or absence of governors'
political action. Understanding governors' (in)action requires uncovering the grounds for its justification and legitimation. The enabling role of the discourse, fusing the ideas of democracy and federalism, propelled autonomous behavior on the part of regional elites. The shift in the dominant
discursive frame that occurred in Russia under the leadership of Putin brought to prominence the idea of strengthening state power, thus making defiant and autonomy-seeking behavior by regional elites untenable.