Nonrepresentative Representatives: An Experimental Study of the Decision Making of Elected Politicians - CORRIGENDUM
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 428-428
ISSN: 1537-5943
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In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 428-428
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 302-321
ISSN: 1537-5943
A considerable body of work in political science is built upon the assumption that politicians are more purposive, strategic decision makers than the citizens who elect them. At the same time, other work suggests that the personality profiles of office seekers and the environment they operate in systematically amplifies certain choice anomalies. These contrasting perspectives persist absent direct evidence on the reasoning characteristics of representatives. We address this gap by administering experimental decision tasks to incumbents in Belgium, Canada, and Israel. We demonstrate that politicians are as or more subject to common choice anomalies when compared to nonpoliticians: they exhibit a stronger tendency to escalate commitment when facing sunk costs, they adhere more to policy choices that are presented as the status-quo, their risk calculus is strongly subject to framing effects, and they exhibit distinct future time discounting preferences. This has obvious implications for our understanding of decision making by elected politicians.
In: American political science review, Band 118, Heft 2, S. 1037-1045
ISSN: 1537-5943
In an influential recent study, Broockman and Skovron (2018) found that American politicians consistently overestimate the conservativeness of their constituents on a host of issues. Whether this conservative bias in politicians' perceptions of public opinion is a uniquely American phenomenon is an open question with broad implications for the quality and nature of democratic representation. We investigate it in four democracies: Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. Despite these countries having political systems that differ greatly, we document a strong and persistent conservative bias held by a majority of the 866 representatives interviewed. Our findings highlight the conservative bias in elites' perception of public opinion as a widespread regularity and point toward a pressing need for further research on its sources and impacts.
In: American political science review, Band 117, Heft 4, S. 1429-1447
ISSN: 1537-5943
Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians' careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 44, Heft 6, S. 1259-1279
ISSN: 1467-9221
Research has shown that politicians' perceptions of public opinion are subject to social projection. When estimating the opinions of voters on a broad range of issues, politicians tend to assume that their own preferences are shared by voters. This article revisits this finding and adds to the literature in three ways. First, it makes a conceptual contribution by bringing together different approaches to the analysis of projection and its consequences. Second, relying on data from surveys with politicians (n = 866) in four countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland) conducted between March 2018 and September 2019, it shows that there is more projection in politicians' estimations of their partisan electorate than in their estimations of the general public or of their geographic district. Third, comparing the data on politician projection with data from parallel surveys with citizens, the article reveals that—at least in three out of the four countries studied here—elected politicians are not better at avoiding erroneous projection than ordinary citizens. The article discusses the implications of these findings for the workings of representative democracy.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 85, Heft 1, S. 209-222
ISSN: 1468-2508
Das CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) legt den Schwerpunkt auf "the politics of populism", also auf Populismus. Es erforscht länderübergreifend den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Aufstieg von populistischen Parteien und der Verteilung von "populistischen" Einstellungen innerhalb der Bevölkerung. Hauptziel des Moduls ist es, die Auffassungen der BürgerInnen von politischen Eliten, gesellschaftlichen "Out-Groups" und nationaler Identität sowie die sich hieraus ergebenden Implikationen für repräsentative Demokratien zu analysieren. Die Daten erlauben es Forschenden somit, die Variation im Wettbewerb politischer Eliten und "populistischer" Einstellungen über Demokratien hinweg mit einzubeziehen, und zu untersuchen, wie solche Wahrnehmungen das Wahlverhalten von BürgerInnen beeinflussen.
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