Search results

This research reports an exploration of the relationship between a decision maker's role and his perception during an international crisis. Research on the social and political processes of the United Nations suggests that a variety of factors, including communication patterns, nonnational roles, and learning experiences may produce a role orientation in delegates that would have an impact upon their perceptions even when their nation is involved in an international crisis. This proposition is explored using content analysis data from the 1956 Suez crisis. The decision makers whose perceptions furnish the data are the Egyptian and Israeli Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and the occupants of high foreign policy positions in the national capitals of Egypt and Israel. The initial analysis of the data indicates only very small differences in the perceptions. The analysis of the data does not support the original proposition. Finally, some caveats concerning the research are raised.

Data from a study of internat'l conflict in the Middle East supported by the Office of Naval Res are drawn upon. The focus is on the manner in which decision-make rs in an internat'l conflict situation perceive themselves, their allies, & their enemies. A content analysis of 82 Egyptian & Israeli documents relevant to internat'l pol was done for 3 time periods: (1) Oct 27-Nov 10, 1956; (2) Nov 11-Nov 24, 1956; & (3) Nov 25-Dec 5, 1956. Data show that to a large extent the findings of small group studies are also relevant to nations: Winners & losers in intergroup competition will hold diff evaluations of themselves, their allies, & their enemies. As hyp'ed, & with few inconsistencies, Egypt was appraised positively in Period (1) by Egyptians, but less positively in Periods (2) & (3); Egypt's allies were appraised positively in Period (1), but less positively in Periods (2) & (3); & Egypt's enemies were perceived negatively in Period (1) & less negatively in (2) & (3). For Israel, the findings, as hyp'ed were: (a) Israel was appraised positively by Israelis in Period (1) & more positively in Periods (2) & (3); (b) Israel's allies were evaluated positively in Period (1) & more positively in Periods (2) & (3); (c) Israel's enemies were perceived negatively in Period (1) & more negatively in Periods (2) & (3). 6 Tables. M. Maxfield.

The proclivity of military regimes and their leaders for more frequent involvement in international conflict than other autocracies has been shown in several studies. The question raised here is not whether they participate in more conflicts and disputes, but rather whether after the leaders of military regimes enter office they initiate these acts more quickly than the leaders of other types of autocracies. Drawing on three authoritarian regime typologies and examining the time to the initiation of any dispute and the initiation of violent disputes, our results show that in comparison to other authoritarian leaders a subset of military leaders is distinctly trigger-happy.

This review essay examines a number of areas in the study of war management. First, current work on war bargaining combines previous models of prewar bargaining with intra-war bargaining. These models attempt to depict both the elements of intra-war bargaining and its possible outcome within a dynamic setting in which battles as well as diplomacy provide combatants with information about the possible military outcome of the war. Second, studies of the domestic politics of war management focused primarily on the interrelations between war progress, casualties, and public opinion. As such these studies are strongly biased towards democratic politics of war management. We know very little about the domestic process of war management in non-democratic states. Nor is there much systematic empirical work on civil-military relations during wartime. Third, war expansion models have expanded our knowledge on the factors that increase the probability of third party intervention, as well as on the domestic and international factors that prohibit intervention. Fourth, the literature on the relationship between war management and war outcomes focused on selection models and performance models that attempt to account for the disproportionate tendency of democracies to win the war they fight. Finally, mediation studies have expanded our knowledge of the conditions under which third parties are likely to enter the war as peaceful mediators, the strategies of mediation they select, and the effect of these factors on the outcome of the mediation process. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these literatures and identify several important lacunae that may stimulate future research on war management.

Broad analytic assessments of research areas can be invaluable for scholars because they can inform the ongoing feedback process between theory and research that is at the heart of scientific inquiry. Unfortunately, Simowitz's (1998) evaluation of diffusion analyses of conflict has several problematic characteristics that make it less useful to the research community than might otherwise be the case. The major difficulties we see in her article are: (1) the forced, idiosyncratic synthesis of the standard of scientific progress and its consequent application; (2) the excessively unilinear conception of scientific process (and progress); (3) the inaccurate understanding of some of the research on war diffusion; (4) the failure to include in the evaluation several studies and results that might have led to different conclusions; and (5) the absence of any constructive suggestion of where research on the topic of war and conflict diffusion might profitably be directed.

An examination of the alliance choices of democratic states between 1920 and 1939 and between 1946 and 1965 is undertaken to answer the question, do democracies have a tendency to ally with each other more than they ought to according to probability? The analysis of the data indicates that during the first period there was an initial tendency for democratic states to ally with each other at a higher rate than probability indicates should have been the case, but that the overall level of democratic alliances decreased as the rate of their existing alliances dissolved and democracies sought other types of partners. During the period from 1946 to 1965 alliances between democracies were formed and maintained at much higher rates than probability indicates should have been the case. Further analysis demonstrates that this effect is probably not significantly affected by either the effects of previous wartime alliances or geography.