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The prime objective of this paper is to suggest a modification of existing structural-functional theory that will enable it better to incorporate sociol'al findings with respect to soc change & the recurrent tensions within & among soc systems. Specifically, explicit recognition must be accorded the existence of 'contradictory functional requirements' - inferred from contradictory structural arrangements - which appear to inhere in all soc systems or impinge upon them from without. This orientation should help to bridge the gap between the 2 out standing models in contemporary sociol: the integrationist or co-operation model, & the conflict or contest model. An effort is made to spell out the details of the argument & to provide empirical illustrations to clarify the discussion. Finally, a number of theoretical & methodological implications that stem from this orientation are pointed out. AA.

The marginal man-who conforms only partially to the instit'al expectations of the reference group-is seen as the most fruitful source of soc information in many types of res. The need for marginality in key informants is explained in terms of the fact that a S who over-identifies with a system or set of roles responds unreflectingly, & one who is trying to shift identification will so repudiate his former role that is responses will be distorted. The informant defined as deviant, however, may have more insight into certain aspects of the soc system than those who wholeheartedly accept it. From this point of view it is emphasized that renegades from top power positions are often able or willing to give soc sci'ts information re decision-making processes which then might otherwise be unable to obtain. The stable, well functioning marginal man is the focal point of COMM between 2 systems, & thus has unique value in soc investigation. L. Tumin.

A survey of two census tracts at opposite ends of the SE hierarchy in Austin, Texas was undertaken as a pilot study to determine attitudes toward questionnaires, the interviewing process, and the role of the interviewer. 82 and 66 R's were randomly selected from the highest and lowest tracts respectively. Most people in both tracts favored `freedom of interviewing' by answering no (72% and 54% respectively) to the question: 'Do you think the city should set up controls to restrict the interviewing of people?' A majority also preferred personal interviews to mail or telephone interviews. R's were least willing to be interviewed about money matters or finances, and their family life. They were most willing to answer questions about their religious beliefs and their occup's. R's from the lower SE level tract were signif less willing to answer questions about their political beliefs than the R's from the higher level tract. Analysis by level of educ showed also that R's with Coll educ were signif'ly less willing to answer questions on family life. More research is needed on the reactions of different groups and sub-cultures to the interview, to questionnaires etc, & on the possible stereotyping of the role of interviewer. K. Geiger.

The paper indicates that 'in the struggle for social power among special interest groups in a competitive social order, certain kinds of action can be observed-those involving the minimax, randomized strategy, and the formation and dissolution of coalitions.' This consistency in competitive action makes it observable to scientific analysis. The author utilizes von Neumann's theory of games to analyze two cases-the Taft-Eisenhower struggle for the 1952 Republican presidential nomination and the dispute between the steel companies and the CIO steelworkers in 1952. Competitive action is not necessarily irrational nor is it necessarily random. The author concludes from his case analyses that the principles of strategy formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern are useful in interpreting the actions of groups in competitive situations. An implication of the analysis is that the theory is 'extra-cultural' in that similar actions are found in divergent and even antagonistic value systems. E. Scott.