Suchergebnisse

We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our describing a world that plausibly has indeterminate chances. Rationality requires a certain alignment of your credences with corresponding hypotheses about the chances. Thus, if you hypothesize the chances to be indeterminate, your will inherit their indeterminacy in your corresponding credences. Our third argument is motivated by a dilemma. Epistemic rationality requires you to stay open-minded about contingent matters about which your evidence has not definitively legislated. Practical rationality requires you to be able to act decisively at least sometimes. These requirements can conflict with each other-for thanks to your open-mindedness, some of your options may have undefined expected utility, and if you are choosing among them, decision theory has no advice to give you. Such an option is playing Nover and Hájek's Pasadena Game, and indeed any option for which there is a positive probability of playing the Pasadena Game. You can serve both masters, epistemic rationality and practical rationality, with an indeterminate credence to the prospect of playing the Pasadena game. You serve epistemic rationality by making your upper probability positive-it ensures that you are open-minded. You serve practical rationality by making your lower probability 0-it provides guidance to your decision-making. No sharp credence could do both.

We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our describing a world that plausibly has indeterminate chances. Rationality requires a certain alignment of your credences with corresponding hypotheses about the chances. Thus, if you hypothesize the chances to be indeterminate, your will inherit their indeterminacy in your corresponding credences. Our third argument is motivated by a dilemma. Epistemic rationality requires you to stay open-minded about contingent matters about which your evidence has not definitively legislated. Practical rationality requires you to be able to act decisively at least sometimes. These requirements can conflict with each other-for thanks to your open-mindedness, some of your options may have undefined expected utility, and if you are choosing among them, decision theory has no advice to give you. Such an option is playing Nover and Hájek's Pasadena Game, and indeed any option for which there is a positive probability of playing the Pasadena Game. You can serve both masters, epistemic rationality and practical rationality, with an indeterminate credence to the prospect of playing the Pasadena game. You serve epistemic rationality by making your upper probability positive-it ensures that you are open-minded. You serve practical rationality by making your lower probability 0-it provides guidance to your decision-making. No sharp credence could do both.

Many real‐world planning and decision problems are far too uncertain, too variable, and too complicated to support realistic mathematical models. Nonetheless, we explain the usefulness, in these situations, of qualitative insights from mathematical decision theory. We demonstrate the integration of info‐gap robustness in decision problems in which surprise and ignorance are predominant and where personal and collective psychological factors are critical. We present practical guidelines for employing adaptable‐choice strategies as a proxy for robustness against uncertainty. These guidelines include being prepared for more surprises than we intuitively expect, retaining sufficiently many options to avoid premature closure and conflicts among preferences, and prioritizing outcomes that are steerable, whose consequences are observable, and that do not entail sunk costs, resource depletion, or high transition costs. We illustrate these concepts and guidelines with the example of the medical management of the 2003 SARS outbreak in Vietnam.

pt. 1. Historical treatments of ignorance in philosophy, literature and the human sciences -- pt. 2. Registering the unknown : ignorance as methodology -- pt. 3. Valuing and managing the unknown in science, technology and medicine -- pt. 4. Power and ignorance : oppression, emancipation and shifting subjectivities -- pt. 5. Ignorance in economic theory, risk management and security studies.

Aims: To conduct an empirical investigation of the efficacy of law enforcement in reducing heroin supply in Australia. Specifically, this paper addresses the question of whether heroin purity levels in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) could be predicted by heroin seizures at the national level by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in the preceding year. Design: We considered two forms of evidence. First, a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) change-point model was used to discover (a) if there was a substantial increase in heroin seizures by the AFP, (b) when the increase began and (c) whether it occurred after increased funding to the Australian Federal Police for the purpose of drug law enforcement. Second, standard time-series methods were used to ascertain whether fluctuations in heroin seizure weights or the frequency of large-scale seizures after the aforementioned changes in seizure levels predicted fluctuations in heroin purity levels in the ACT after autocorrelation had been removed from the purity series. Findings: A Bayesian MCMC change-point model supported the hypothesis that heroin seizures rapidly increased about a year before the estimated decline in heroin purity and after the increased funding of AFP. The autoregression models suggested that 10-20% of the variance in the residuals of the heroin purity series was predicted by appropriately lagged residuals of the seizure-number and log-weight series, after autocorrelation had been removed. Conclusion: The overall results are consistent with the hypothesis that large-scale heroin seizures by the AFP reduce street-level heroin supply a year or so later, although the short-term dynamics suggest an 'opponent' response to residual fluctuations in seizures. To our knowledge, this is first time a connection has been identified between large-scale heroin seizures and street-level supply.

Aims: To conduct an empirical investigation of the efficacy of law enforcement in reducing heroin supply in Australia. Specifically, this paper addresses the question of whether heroin purity levels in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) could be predicted by heroin seizures at the national level by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in the preceding year. Design: We considered two forms of evidence. First, a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) change-point model was used to discover (a) if there was a substantial increase in heroin seizures by the AFP, (b) when the increase began and (c) whether it occurred after increased funding to the Australian Federal Police for the purpose of drug law enforcement. Second, standard time-series methods were used to ascertain whether fluctuations in heroin seizure weights or the frequency of large-scale seizures after the aforementioned changes in seizure levels predicted fluctuations in heroin purity levels in the ACT after autocorrelation had been removed from the purity series. Findings: A Bayesian MCMC change-point model supported the hypothesis that heroin seizures rapidly increased about a year before the estimated decline in heroin purity and after the increased funding of AFP. The autoregression models suggested that 10-20% of the variance in the residuals of the heroin purity series was predicted by appropriately lagged residuals of the seizure-number and log-weight series, after autocorrelation had been removed. Conclusion: The overall results are consistent with the hypothesis that large-scale heroin seizures by the AFP reduce street-level heroin supply a year or so later, although the short-term dynamics suggest an 'opponent' response to residual fluctuations in seizures. To our knowledge, this is first time a connection has been identified between large-scale heroin seizures and street-level supply.