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By modelling and analysing Turkey's Kurdish question in light of democratic transition theories, the Scottish Case and recent developments, this article explains the lack of cooperation between the `moderate' Turkish majority and Kurdish actors pursuing peace and European Union membership. It analyses whether there may be more cooperation in the near future and discusses implications for theories of political moderation. A `most different case', Scotland, helps in explaining the Turkish case and in avoiding mono-causal explanations based on cultural stereotypes. Among other factors and unlike the Scottish case, cooperation in the Turkish—Kurdish case is constrained by relations with Iraqi Kurds and the difficulty of identifying the moderates: Kurdish actors moderate in the sense of renouncing violence often make more hard-line political and conceptual claims than violent actors do. Theories need more multifaceted conceptualizations of moderation. The recent electoral success of the ruling political party and the presence of a Kurdish political party in Parliament may enable more moderate—moderate cooperation in the future. This will occur if potentially moderate actors can distance themselves from violence and choose conceptual and political compromise over coercion, and if Turkey, Iraqi-Kurds and the United States can reach an agreement on cooperation.

The main goal of this article is to highlight the importance and implications of a debate that is ongoing in Turkey over the meaning, social-political role, and regulation of Turkey's ethnic-cultural diversity, especially that of its Kurdish component. By itself, this debate can neither bring about any significant change in the political realm nor have a major influence on the "mainstream" Turkish social-political discourse. Despite significant changes during the last decade or so, this discourse continues to predominantly reflect the diversity-phobic, dominant beliefs and values of Turkish nationalism.

This article analyzes the discursive-ideational barriers restricting regional cooperation by examining Turkey's relations with Iraqi Kurds from a critical, theoretical perspective in the context of Turkey's domestic reforms and its relations with the USA and the EU. It is argued that the ethnicity discourse undermines cooperation, insofar as it feeds the perception of rival groups with zero-sum interests. Presenting a simple model, the article argues that replacing the ethnicity discourse with alternative, post-ethnic discourses requires combining alternative discourses with policies that produce positive-sum interests, coordination between groups, and opportunities for joint collective actions. Hence, state capacity to formulate and implement such policies is crucial. Predictions and policy implications are generated accordingly. First, further reconciliation of Turkey's domestic Kurdish conflict through democratic and administrative reforms, EU integration, and the promotion of national-identity models that are more flexible and more reflective of diversity will facilitate cooperation with Iraqi Kurds. Second, prosperity and democratic stability in Iraq will help achieve a lasting resolution in Turkey. Third, regional cooperation requires that domestic and external actors promote the positive-sum perception of Turkish and Kurdish interests. Fourth, research can help by developing linguistic-analytical categories that transcend the narrow discourse of ethnicity in favor of discourses that reflect multiple and compatible group belongings.

This article analyzes the case of Turkey and theorizes about the causal mechanisms that can explain discursive transformations through which dominant perceptions of ethnic identities are suppressed, revived, and remade. Systematic content analysis of a major Turkish newspaper from 1984 through 1998, comparisons across subperiods, in-depth interviews with prominent journalists, and detailed examination of the historical events constitute the empirical analysis. Arguing that the state elites did not form a monolithic group, it is shown that the transformation of the mainstream discourse during the 1990s occurred after several reversals, relatively swiftly, and at least partly despite resistance from with in the state. The Kurdistan Worker's Party conflict; shifting instrumental elite beliefs; breakdown of cooperation among moderates; external developments, including those in Iraq; and cascade mechanisms played causal roles. The explanation contributes to a multidisciplinary body of literatures on public-political discourse, cascade theories of social-political change, ethnic conflict, democratization, Turkey, and Kurds and derives policy implications.

This article develops new analytical categories that are necessary to analyze Turkey's Kurdish conflict in its changed domestic and international environments and to evaluate the policy options. If Turkish state policies and discourse, and that of the other regional and international
actors, signal to Kurds that the Turkish and Kurdish identities are mutually exclusive categories with rival interests, radical shifts may occur in Turkish Kurds' social and political identities and preferences. If state policies promote these identities as complements with compatible interests,
radical shifts are unlikely and Turkey can play a more constructive regional role.

Während den Kurden in der Türkei bis Ende der 1980er Jahre seitens des Staates und der Mainstream-Öffentlichkeit eine eigene ethnische Identität abgesprochen wurde (nach offizieller Sprachregelung gab es keine Kurden), wird jetzt - so das Hauptargument des Beitrags - der politisch folgenreiche Fehler begangen, die kurdische und die türkische Identität als rivalisierende, einander ausschließende Identitäten darzustellen. Diese ausschließende Definition begünstigt die Radikalisierung der Kurden und weitere Verschärfung des Konflikts. Die staatliche Politik sollte als Beitrag zur Lösung des Konflikts im eigenen Land und mit den irakischen Kurden ein Konzept unterstützen und verbreiten, nach dem beide Identitäten komplementäre Interessen haben und miteinander vereinbar sind. (DÜI-Hns)

Examines problems with Turkish democratization vis-a-vis the Kurdish conflict. This conflict is reviewed before articulating the analytical-conceptual requirements for research on Turkish democratization & its efforts to integrate with Europe. How legal-political restrictions affect various social-political actors is theorized, developing a framework to conceptualize the endogenous relation between identities, collective actions, & policy. In this light, new categories are provided for different definitions of Turkish & Kurdish identities. The dynamics of the public-political discourse are then examined, differentiating between private & public expressions of different ethnic & national identities, & contemplating possible shifts in the dominant public discourse. Private understandings of Turkish & Kurdish identities are addressed to assess whether they can form a basis for democratic change. Policy implications are touched on in closing. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 47 References. J. Zendejas

By building upon cascades literature, the author offers an explanation for rapid & massive polarization & applies it to the former Yugoslavia. The dominant images of ethnic categories in society change through cascades of individual reactions triggered by traumatic events, ideological shifts, or the activities of ethnic entrepreneurs. Polarization becomes self-propagating if the protagonists of a certain image of ethnic identities, called the divisive image, appear to have reached a critical mass. Downward ethnic preference falsification, people's concealment of their support for the divisive image in public, increases the severity of polarization. The article argues that downward falsification was significant in Yugoslavia before the 1980s due to policies that suppressed the public expression of the divisive image but insufficiently encouraged its elimination in private. In the 1980s, polarization reversed this trend & led to widespread upward ethnic preference falsification, the exaggeration of the support for the divisive image in public. 4 Tables, 81 References. Adapted from the source document.