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This paper employs a dynamic framework to compare the effects of alternative government activities on convergence of industrialized economies to the technology frontier. The government's Instruments include facilitating private investment and education policy. The latter enhances skills of heterogenous specialists and imply the decision on their respective shares. The analysis distinguishes between an isolated policy of a single economy and coordinated policies of various countries. Which policy maximizes the speed of convergence is crucially affected by the economy's state of development. A policy switch between the mentioned instruments while catching-up may be preferable.

This paper employs a dynamic framework to compare the effects of alternative governmental activities on the process of convergence. Policy instruments include facilitating private investment and public expenditure (amount and structure) that act as enhancing individual skills. Highly skilled specialists are endowed with both technological and systemic skills, though to different extents. We analyze how governmental activity speeds up convergence thereby considering productivity growth at the technology frontier either as exogenous or as endogenous parameter. Which policy maximizes the speed of convergence is crucially affected by a country's state of development. A policy switch while catching-up may be preferable.

This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of productive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may benefit from the other region's public input, e.g. the extent to which regional road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced integration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower. Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends up in suboptimally high concentration.

This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of productive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may benefit from the other region's public input, e.g. the extent to which regional road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced integration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower. Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends up in suboptimally high concentration.

This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of productive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may benefit from the other region's public input, e.g. the extent to which regional road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced integration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower. Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends up in suboptimally high concentration.

This paper analyzes the growth impact of fiscal and institutional governmental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region as determined by the number of firms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, fiscal and institutional policies as well as their interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback effects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown that depending on the region's size different types of the public input maximize growth.

We analyze within a dynamic model how firms decide on capital investment if the accompanying adjustment costs are a function of governmental activity. The government provides a public input and decides on the degree of rivalry. The productive public input enhances private capital productivity and reduces adjustment costs. We derive the equilibrium in which capital and investment ratio are both constant, carry out comparative dynamic analysis and discuss the model's policy implications.

In diesem Papier wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen die Verfügbarkeit von Infrastruktur auf die unternehmerische Investitionsentscheidung hat. Dabei ist unterstellt, dass Infrastruktur zum einen Input in der Produktionsfunktion ist und zum anderen die Höhe der Anpassungskosten beeinflusst. Als formaler Analyserahmen dient ein partialanalytisches dynamisches Modell. Da die Infrastruktur von Überfüllungseffekten betroffen sein kann, ist neben dem absoluten Umfang auch der vorherrschende Rivalitätsgrad zentral für das resultierende Gleichgewicht. Drei zentrale Einflusskanäle werden identifiziert: ein Produktions?, ein Anpassungskosten? und ein Niveaueffekt. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Ausweitung des Umfangs an Infrastruktur Investitionen in Kapital eindeutig erhöht, wohingegen vom Rivalitätsgrad uneindeutige Effekte auf die unternehmerische Investitionsentscheidung ausgehen.

In this paper the impacts of income and consumption taxes are analyzed within a model of stochastic endogenous growth with congestion. It is shown that the optimal amount of governmental input diminishes with uncertainty and that the optimal financing depends on the relation between the degrees of rivalry and relative risk aversion. Due to the insurance effect associated with the taxation of stochastic income flows, the growth effect of taxation is ambiguous. There is a continuum of optimal tax policies which depends on the assumptions about the governmental budget constraint. The results for a balanced budget are contrasted with the outcomes in the setting with government debt. We demonstrate that in both cases the optimal structure of financing government expenditure not only depends on the degree of rivalry, as in the corresponding deterministic congestion models, but also on the degree of risk aversion.

This paper analyzes growth and welfare effects of income taxation in a stochastic endogenous growth model with externalities in human-capital accumulation. The government participates in individual income risks by the collection of a flat-rate income tax that affects the mean and the variance of after-tax income. We examine the implications of a tax-transfer policy for the macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy. An increase in the tax rate on mean income has an unambiguously negative effect on the expected growth rate. Paradoxically, this may induce welfare gains. The opposite results can be derived for a rise in the tax rate on transitory income. These counter-intuitive results of the stochastic Arrow-Romer model can be ascribed to the specific int eraction of consumption and portfolio choice in the determination of growth and welfare.

This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of productive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may benefit from the other region's public input, e.g. the extent to which regional road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced integration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower. Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends up in suboptimally high concentration.

This paper analyzes the growth impact of fiscal and institutional governmental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region as determined by the number of firms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, fiscal and institutional policies as well as their interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback effects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown that depending on the region's size different types of the public input maximize growth. ; nicht verfügbar