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Political competition, and especially inter-party competition, is a key concept in liberal democratic thought. This article develops three conceptions (or dimensions) of inter-party competition: (1) Contestability, (2) Conflict of Interest and (3) Performance Sensitivity. Each dimension is operationalized, and comparative time series data are presented for 15 advanced democracies, 1950-87. Inter-party competition is shown to vary mostly between countries, but also inter-temporally. The second part of the article investigates socio-demographic, economic and organizational explanations of cross-national differences in inter-party competition. A causal model based on these theories is specified and estimated. The model yields stronger results for contestability and performance sensitivity than for conflict of interest. Finally, possible consequences of inter-party competition for individuals, organizations and political systems are discussed.

From assumptions of parties as rational actors, this study develops four measures of government performance: duration, mode of resignation, subsequent alternation, and electoral success. These measures are used in a test of competing hypotheses concerning minority government performance in parliamentary democracies. Minority governments are conventionally portrayed as poor performers, but tests of this proposition have been seriously limited. An alternative hypothesis depicts minority governments as rational cabinet solutions without significant performance liabilities. These hypotheses are tested against an extensive cross-national data set including 323 postwar governments in 15 parliamentary democracies. The conventional wisdom about minority governments is not supported by the evidence. In some respects, minority governments are clearly superior to majority coalitions. Moreover, minority government formation may enhance systemic responsiveness and accountability. The findings support the explanation of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions.

Minority cabinets account for about 35% of all governments in 15 parliamentary democracies since 1945. Conventional explanations associate minority government formation with political crises, instability, polarization, factionalization, and failures of interparty bargaining. Such explanations are tested and found lacking in empirical support. Instead, minority governments are explained as rational solutions under specified conditions. Minority cabinets form when even oppositional parties can influence parliamentary legislation, and when government participation is likely to be a liability in future elections. This rationalist explanation receives substantial empirical support in tests against competing hypotheses. The results suggest important modifications to theories of government and coalition formation.

MINORITY CABINETS ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 35% OF ALL GOVERNMENTS IN 15 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1945. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS ASSOCIATE MINORITY GOVERNMENT FORMATION WITH POLITICAL CRISES, INSTABILITY, POLARIZATION, FACTIONALIZATION, AND FAILURES OF INTERPARTY BARGAINING. SUCH EXPLANATIONS ARE TESTED AND FOUND LACKING IN EMPIRICAL SUPPORT. INSTEAD, MINORITY GOVERNMENTS CONDITIONS. MINORITY CABINETS FORM WHEN EVEN OPPOSITIONAL PARTIES CAN INFLUENCE PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION, AND WHEN GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IS LIKELY TO BE A LIABILITY IN FUTURE ELECTI THIS RATIONALIST EXPLANATION RECEIVES SUBSTANTIAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT IN TESTS AGAINST COMPETING HYPOTHESES. THE RESULTS SUGGEST IMPORTANT MODIFICATIONS TO THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT AND COALITION FORMATION.

"The Madisonian Turn is an outstanding assessment of the functioning of democratic institutions in the Nordic countries. If democracy is in trouble in Scandinavia, then it is surely facing problems everywhere, so the book will be read carefully by those concerned about contemporary governance in all modern democracies."--Michael Gallagher, Trinity College, Dublin "This welcome and timely re-evaluation of Nordic politics constitutes a major contribution to comparative government, and is likely to stand as the definitive treatment of politics in the region for many years to come."--Peter Mair, European University Institute "This book is unique in its comparative scope and the wealth of information on the state of parliamentary democracy in the Nordic countries. It is particularly useful for the comparativists who do not come from these countries, because the original literature which it covers in detail is often not accessible for the English-speaking audience."--Hanspeter Kriesi, University of Zurich "The strength of The Madisonian Turn is to interface detailed empirical evidence on the dynamics of democratic politics in Scandinavia with an elaboration and test of rival theories of change in the politics of postindustrial democracies. This book is an inspiration for students of Northern Europe, but also for scholars of comparative legislatures and political parties more generally."--Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University Parliamentary democracy is the most common regime type in the contemporary political world, but the quality of governance depends on effective parliamentary oversight and strong political parties. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have traditionally been strongholds of parliamentary democracy. In recent years, however, critics have suggested that new challenges such as weakened popular attachment, the advent of cartel parties, the judicialization of politics, and European integration have threatened the institutions of parliamentary democracy in the Nordic region. This volume examines these claims and their implications. The authors find that the Nordic states have moved away from their previous resemblance to a Westminster model toward a form of parliamentary democracy with more separation-of-powers features--a Madisonian model. These features are evident both in vertical power relations (e.g., relations with the European Union) and horizontal ones (e.g., increasingly independent courts and central banks). Yet these developments ar ...