Suchergebnisse

In a great deal of empirical work on distributional analysis, the only sorts of inequality measures employed are ' relative' ones. The present paper argues the case for a more plural approach to inequality measurement, in which both 'absolute' and 'intermediate' conceptualizations of inequality are admitted. In particular, it is suggested that there is a strong case for the employment of intermediate measures of inequality in assessing over time changes in inequality and, through that route, the inclusiveness or otherwise of the process of growth in per capita income. The purpose of the paper is two fold: exposition and persuasion.

Distributional judgments'-judgments on the extent of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth-are routinely made by economists in exercises aimed at comparing inequalities in alternative situations. Yet the measurement of inequality is informed by certain nuances, which it would do well to be attentive to. In particular, the values underlying measurement protocols are not always made explicit, which tends to lend a somewhat misleading semblance of 'value-neutrality' to the activity of measurement. It is argued, with specific reference to the problem of inequality measurement, that such an orientation can compromise the possibility of accurate diagnosis and appropriate policy prescription. There is little that is original in this article, and much that is owed to the pioneering contributions of Serge-Chritophe Kolm. The emphasis throughout is on explicating an important issue through a deliberate effort at achieving simplicity in both argument and expression.

This essay is a quick critique of one aspect of Derek Parfit's criticism of Egalitarianism in his larger consideration of the claims of, and distinction between, Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. It reviews issues relating to the 'Levelling Down Objection' and the 'Divided World Example'. More specifically, it is argued that the Levelling Down Objection is a serious problem only for Pure Telic Egalitarianism, not for Pluralist Telic Egalitarianism; and that even in a Divided World, one can have an egalitarian justification for preferring an equal distribution of a smaller sum of wellbeing to an unequal distribution of a larger sum. By these means, it is contended that Parfit's claim of the vulnerability of Egalitarianism to the Levelling Down Objection and the Divided World Example is not sustainable.

Abstract.  It is plausible that the extent of measured aggregate poverty should depend upon the distribution of poverty across a population's subgroups. The aggregate measure of poverty would then lend itself to 'penal adjustment' to reflect the extent of inter‐group disparity in the distribution of poverty. In the present paper, this approach to poverty measurement is examined by advancing a diagrammatic aid to analysis called the group poverty profile. The latter is a virtual transplantation, to the present context, of the notion of a deprivation profile that has been explored and analysed by Shorrocks (1996) in a different context.