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AbstractPublic support for and voluntary compliance with protective policy measures are crucial to mitigating the spread of infectious disease. However, it is unclear why and how people with diverse cultural biases support particular protective policies. Relying on the Cultural Theory (CT) of risk, we hypothesize that value congruence with social distancing and a vaccine mandate during the COVID‐19 pandemic influences the level of public support for and compliance with these protective policies. Analyzing a Chinese nationwide sample, we find that the effects of cultural biases on public support and compliance vary not only with cultural biases but by how these are mediated through value congruence with particular protective policies. As hypothesized, hierarchical cultural biases increase public support for and compliance with social distancing and a vaccine mandates both directly and (indirectly) through value congruence. By contrast, as hypothesized, fatalistic cultural biases decrease public support for and compliance with social distancing both directly and (indirectly) through lack of value congruence and individualistic biases decrease public support for and compliance with social distancing and a vaccine mandate both directly and (indirectly) through lack of value congruence. However, the hypothesized effects of fatalistic biases did not hold for the vaccine mandate. We discuss reasons why these latter hypotheses regarding the vaccine mandate were not validated and suggest that risk analysts and communicators do more to discover and explain why particular protective policies are congruent with diverse cultural values.

What explains party preference? Ideology and values do but these explanations are undertheorized. We offer grid-group cultural theory (CT) to provide a theory of ideology and values to explain party preference. We aim to demonstrate the value of an operationalization of CT that includes rejection of cultural bias (rejection of political values and beliefs) to explain party preference. Our study builds on research that recognizes the importance of negative partisanship and of rejecting cultural biases and other values in party choice. We analyze the influence of cultural biases on party preference in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. We find that respondents' top two cultural biases explain up to a third of the variation in respondents' party support in these Nordic multi-party systems and that rejection of cultural biases is an important determinant of party preference. We discuss how our analysis can be extended to other party systems including those with only two major parties.

This symposium showcases diverse contributions that a particular institutional theory of cultural biases makes to public administration and policy research. Bridging and integrating these subfields, the theory offers powerful explanations for the ways in which institutional processes drive policy‐making. Developed initially by Douglas using Durkheimian theory, Hood and Wildavsky made the theory increasingly influential in public administration and policy. Today, the theory has several variants which nevertheless share common core elements. We briefly survey this institutional theory's contributions to the study of public administration and policy before describing its central claims, analysing the uses of its variants in the symposium articles, and identifying their key advances. We conclude with challenges and promising developments in efforts to conceptualize, operationalize, and test the theory in public administration and policy research.

AbstractCultural theory (CT) developed from grid/group analysis, which posits that different patterns of social relations—hierarchist, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist—produce compatible cultural biases influencing assessment of which hazards pose high or low risk and how to manage them. Introduced to risk analysis (RA) in 1982 by Douglas and Wildavsky's Risk and Culture, this institutional approach to social construction of risk surprised a field hitherto focused on psychological influences on risk perceptions and behavior. We explain what CT is and how it developed; describe and evaluate its contributions to the study of risk perception and management, and its prescriptions for risk assessment and management; and identify opportunities and resources to develop its contributions to RA. We suggest how the diverse, fruitful, but scattered efforts to develop CT both inside and outside the formal discipline of RA (as exemplified by the Society for Risk Analysis) might be leveraged for greater theoretical, methodological, and applied progress in the field.

In this study, we investigate four attitudinal structures (including liberal, conservative, and libertarian configurations) associated with two ideological dimensions among American voters and demonstrate that these attitudinal structures are related in expected ways to differential preferences for the values of freedom, order, and equality/caring. Liberals are inclined to trade freedom for equality/caring but not for order, whereas conservatives are their opposites—willing to trade freedom for order but not for equality/caring. In contrast, libertarians are generally less willing than others to trade freedom for either order or equality/caring (although they probably prefer order to equality/caring). The fourth ideological type is more willing than the others to relinquish freedom, preferring both order and equality/caring. Depending on how our results are interpreted, this fourth type may be characterized as either communitarian or humanitarian. These findings help close the gap between unidimensional conceptions and multidimensional evidence of ideological organization in political attitudes by demonstrating that value structure and attitudinal structure are strongly related in two ideological dimensions.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Editor's Preface -- Introduction -- Part 1: Making Budgets -- 1. A Budget for All Seasons?: Why the Traditional Budget Lasts -- 2. The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting -- 3. Rescuing Policy Analysis -- 4. Toward a Radical Incrementalism -- 5. The Annual Expenditure Increment -- 6. Budgetary Reform in an Age of Big Government -- 7. Equality, Spending Limits, and the Growth of Government -- Part 2: The Culture of Budgeting -- 8. Toward a Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes -- 9. Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries -- 10. The Movement toward Spending Limits in American and Canadian Budgeting -- 11. The Transformation of Budgetary Norms -- 12. A Cultural Theory of Expenditure Growth and (Un)balanced Budgets -- 13. The Budget as New Social Contract -- 14. On the Balance of Budgetary Cultures -- Part 3: Budgeting and Governing -- 15. Securing Budgetary Convergence Within the European Community -- 16. If You Can't Budget, How Can You Govern? -- Postscript -- Index