Suchergebnisse

This note helps to explain how cabinet-level concentration of power is constrained by party level concentration of seats. Arend Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy (1999) measures concentration of executive power by the frequency of minimal winning and one-party cabinets (MW/OP), and party concentration by the effective number (N) of legislative parties. In his factor analysis, these highly correlated indices are the central features that distinguish consensual from majoritarian systems. The present study establishes a quantitative logical relationship leading from N to the major component of MW/OP, so as to explain the reasons behind Lijphart's empirical observation. The note analyses separately the frequency of various types of cabinet coalitions that Lijphart's book has lumped together. It also offers a new way to visualize the effective number of legislative parties, as twice the minimal number of parties needed to form a minimal winning coalition. © 2002, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.

How large must parties be to achieve minimal representation in a national assembly? The degree of institutional constraints is reflected indirectly by the number of seat-winning parties (n) and more directly by the threshold of representation (T), defined as the vote level at which parties have a 50-50 chance to win their first seat. The existing theoretical threshold formulas use district-level reasoning and therefore overestimate the nationwide threshold. This study extends the theory to the nationwide level. In addition to district magnitude (M), the number of electoral districts and hence assembly size (S) emerge as important variables. When all seats are allocated in M-seat districts, T=75%/[(M+1)(S/M)0.5] and n=(MS)0.25, T and n are connected by T=75%/[n2+(S/n2)]. These theoretical expectation values are tested with 46 durable electoral systems. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

This study focuses on the eastern Finno-Ugrians, those located in the Russian Federation, whereas the western Finno-Ugrians live mainly in states that are part of the European Union (Finland) or hope to join it (Hungary, Estonia). Under the present conditions, one might expect the eastern Finno-Ugrians to have more in common with the other minorities in the Federation than with the western Finno-Ugrians. However, the strongest ethnically distinct peoples within the Russian Federation are Turkic and Muslim, and they look southward for cultural and political models. Excluded from this Turkic fraternity, the remaining indigenous minorities in the northwestern part of the Federation might be expected to establish a separate sphere of cooperation practically by default, based on common circumstances and vulnerability. The Finno-Ugrian label supplies a common denominator, strengthened by the myth of common origins. The scope of this article is cooperation and foreign relations involving the eastern Finno-Ugrians. It excludes cooperation among the western predominantly Finno-Ugrian states and their foreign policies, unless these affect the eastern Finno-Ugrians. The basic issues are: the level of interaction; the type of interaction-political, economic, social, or cultural; and how this interaction matters, if at all.

This theory specifies the party sizes expected on the basis of constraints imposed by simple electoral rules. Duverger's law and hypothesis states that under the single-member plurality rule third parties tend to be eliminated, while proportional representation in multi-seat districts enables more than two parties to thrive. Expanding on Duverger' statements, the seat and vote shares of parties at all size ranks are calculated here, using nothing but two institutional inputs (district magnitude and assembly size) plus the number of voters. These are the baseline values expected if (and only if) institutional constraints were the only factor, with other factors balancing themselves out. The theory is complete in the sense of leading to complete party size structure. Among the relatively simple electoral systems the institutional baselines do reflect the long-term averages in New Zealand, while the residuals indicate the imbalance of inputs by other factors in the case of The Netherlands and Finland, and especially in the case of the UK.

This theory specifies the party sizes expected on the basis of constraints imposed by simple electoral rules. Duverger's law and hypothesis states that under the single-member plurality rule third parties tend to be eliminated, while proportional representation in multi-seat districts enables more than two parties to thrive. Expanding on Duverger' statements, the seat and vote shares of parties at all size ranks are calculated here, using nothing but two institutional inputs (district magnitude and assembly size) plus the number of voters. These are the baseline values expected if (and only if) institutional constraints were the only factor, with other factors balancing themselves out. The theory is complete in the sense of leading to complete party size structure. Among the relatively simple electoral systems the institutional baselines do reflect the long-term averages in New Zealand, while the residuals indicate the imbalance of inputs by other factors in the case of The Netherlands and Finland, and especially in the case of the UK.

This study focuses on the eastern Finno-Ugrians, those located in the Russian Federation, whereas the western Finno-Ugrians live mainly in states that are part of the European Union (Finland) or hope to join it (Hungary, Estonia). Under the present conditions, one might expect the eastern Finno-Ugrians to have more in common with the other minorities in the Federation than with the western Finno-Ugrians. However, the strongest ethnically distinct peoples within the Russian Federation are Turkic and Muslim, and they look southward for cultural and political models. Excluded from this Turkic fraternity, the remaining indigenous minorities in the northwestern part of the Federation might be expected to establish a separate sphere of cooperation practically by default, based on common circumstances and vulnerability. The Finno-Ugrian label supplies a common denominator, strengthened by the myth of common origins. The scope of this article is cooperation and foreign relations involving the eastern Finno-Ugrians. It excludes cooperation among the western predominantly Finno-Ugrian states and their foreign policies, unless these affect the eastern Finno-Ugrians. The basic issues are: the level of interaction; the type of interaction-political, economic, social, or cultural; and how this interaction matters, if at all.

Some basic models in science are not grounded in what we know but in careful specifying of the limits of our ignorance. Boundary conditions on the conceptually possible range determine whether a distribution is likely to be closer to normal or lognormal and whether arithmetic or geometric means should be used. If finite and non-zero boundary values can be defined, then most actual cases tend to be around the center of the possible range. This approach makes it possible to estimate the number of parties in a national assembly within a factor of two, using only assembly size and electoral district magnitude. Deviations from ignorance-based base line are a signal to look for specifically political causes. This approach may be of use in many aspects of political science.

Some basic models in science are not grounded in what we know but in careful specifying of the limits of our ignorance. Boundary conditions on the conceptually possible range determine whether a distribution is likely to be closer to normal or lognormal and whether arithmetic or geometric means should be used. If finite and non-zero boundary values can be defined, then most actual cases tend to be around the center of the possible range. This approach makes it possible to estimate the number of parties in a national assembly within a factor of two, using only assembly size and electoral district magnitude. Deviations from ignorance-based base line are a signal to look for specifically political causes. This approach may be of use in many aspects of political science.

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties (N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions (I) and effective magnitude (M) of electoral system: N= I.6M.15 + 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

The effective number of parties, N = 1/Σp(i)2 (where p(i) is the fractional share of the ith party), usually suffices to describe adequately a constellation of parties of different strengths. Difficulties arise when disparity in party sizes is such that the largest share (p1) surpasses 0.50 (meaning absolute dominance), while N still indicates a multi-party constellation. In such cases N(∞) = 1/p1 is proposed as a supplementary indicator: a value less than 2 indicates absolute dominance. An 'NP' index proposed earlier is a combination of N and N(∞); its values are close of those of N(∞), but NP sometimes falls below 2 even when many parties are relevant for coalition formation. Appendix A offers an alternative approach based on indices of deviation from a norm, but it proves cumbersome.

Some basic models in science are not grounded in what we know but in careful specifying of the limits of our ignorance. Boundary conditions on the conceptually possible range determine whether a distribution is likely to be closer to normal or lognormal and whether arithmetic or geometric means should be used. If finite and non-zero boundary values can be defined, then most actual cases tend to be around the center of the possible range. This approach makes it possible to estimate the number of parties in a national assembly within a factor of two, using only assembly size and electoral district magnitude. Deviations from ignorance-based base line are a signal to look for specifically political causes. This approach may be of use in many aspects of political science.

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties (N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions (I) and effective magnitude (M) of electoral system: N= I.6M.15 + 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

Electoral rules delimit the democratic game, but are also part of the game. In conjunction with political culture and skills they lead to an electoral system. This overview first addresses their effect in mature democracies, especially on the number of parliamentary parties and deviation from proportionality. The results are cautiously extended to early democratization. The main advice is to keep the electoral rules simple, so that world-wide empirical and analytical experience can be used to obtain somewhat predictable outcomes. Once chosen, keep the same rules for at least three elections, so that an electoral system has time to develop. For scholars the main lesson of the newly democratizing countries is modesty in prediction.

The theoretical inclusion and exclusion thresholds are, respectively, the vote shares below which a party cannot possibly win a seat, and above which it cannot possibly fail to do so. They are important in evaluating how hospitable electorcal systems are to small parties. Previously, they have been calculated at the district level. Here the theory is extended to the national level. Surprisingly, the inclusion thresholds depends on the smallest district in the country-not the largest. The exclusion threshold depends on all districts. The theoretical results are compared to empirical observations for 23 electoral systems. The inclusion threshold is indeed close to the minimal vote share that ever led to a seat in the national assembly. In stark contrast, the exclusion threshold is much higher than the maximal vote share that ever failed to produce a seat in practice. The total number of districts emerges as a significant.