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Energy has been at the core of the EU integration since its inception. However, following the path of a shooting star, the key role of energy gradually declined over time, to the level of being basically left out from the Treaties, at least up to Lisbon. The EU has struggled to circumnavigate this "energy-gap" of the Treaties by legislating on energy-related issues by making use of its shared competences in the areas of internal market and environment. However, this effort has resulted in a very fragmented EU energy policy, also characterized by the absence of a major element: security of energy supply. After the 2014 Ukraine crisis a new momentum has emerged in the EU about the urgent need of creating a truly European energy policy, with both the new President of the EU Council and the new EU Commission calling for the creation of a EU Energy Union. This paper argues that the EU should seize this historical opportunity to fill the main long-lasting gap of its energy policy: security of energy supply. To this end, the paper proposes a set of new actions that might be undertaken in this field, also outlying that the most feasible option to the development of a new EU Energy Union seems to be the formation -through a scheme of differentiated integration- of a smaller coalition of Member States committed to quickly advance the integration of their energy policies under the principle that only by acting together the EU will be able to meet the growing energy challenges of the future.

Iran is the perennial "elephant in the room" of international gas trade. The country could well become, one day, a major game changer of international gas markets but today its potential still remains fundamentally untapped due to a number of geopolitical and commercial reasons. Iran owns the first largest proven gas reserves in the world, but since 1997 it is basically a net-importer of gas. This paradoxical situation is due to a number of internal and external factors, which will be widely discussed in the paper. However, the main cause of the current under-exploitation of Iran's gas resources is certainly linked to the international isolation of the country due to the well-known international dispute over its nuclear program. For this reason, if the positive outcome of the recent nuclear talks turn into a complete nuclear deal, great opportunities will likely open up in Iran also with regard to the gas market. The aim of this paper is to analyze the country's gas outlook in the aftermath of a potential nuclear deal, looking at the potential production trends, at the potential export options, but also at the political and commercial barriers that such a development will likely have to face. In fact, a full resolution of the nuclear issue will unlikely automatically change the Iranian gas market in the short term, as a number of commercial issues will continue to remain on the table. In other words, the "elephant" will need a bit of time to move. However, it is sure that its movement will ultimately have a profound and long-lasting impact on international gas markets.

Over the last years Turkey has been increasingly associated in the international political and economic debate with concepts such as "gas corridor" and "gas hub". This characterization of Turkey is clearly mainly due to its unique geographical position at the crossroads the Caspian region, the Middle East and Europe. In particular, this argument is often advanced in the political discussion on the rise of Turkey as a leading regional power and in the debate on the future prospects for the EU-Turkey relations. However, by going beyond the political slogans and by focusing on the concrete gas realities around Turkey this picture could be seriously put into question. The aim of this paper is to explore the real potential role of Turkey in the regional gas markets, firstly focusing on the current situation of gas producing countries around Turkey and then moving to the future prospects of gas cooperation in the region. To this end, the paper will provide an assessment of both the current situation and outlook of gas markets in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel and Cyprus, subsequently providing a discussion of the future prospects of the Southern Gas Corridor and of the potential Eastern Mediterranean Gas Corridor. This analysis will indicate that Turkey will hardly have the potential to become a regional gas hub in the medium term (up to 2020-2025). However, Turkey could have the potential to play an important role in the regional gas markets in the longer term (after 2025-2030) if a number of infrastructural, commercial and political barriers described in the paper are overcome and -last but not the least- if the EU gas demand recovers and the EU market actually needs more natural gas supplies.

The Eastern Mediterranean region is rapidly changing. The turbolent political transition in Egypt after the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, the emergence of Turkey as leading regional power, the tensions between Israel and Gaza and the never-ending dispute between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus are -all together- reshuffling the regional geopolitical equilibrium. At the same time natural gas findings are flourishing in the offshore of Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus, reshaping the regional energy map and rapidly making the Eastern Mediterranean a world-class natural gas province. These geopolitical and energy pressures are rapidly converging, generating a number of new challenges and opportunities for each player in the region. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview on these new regional developments and to propose a critical discussion of the market opportunities and geopolitical risks related to the potential emergence of a new Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor.

This paper, presenting a wide range of issues related to the role of Turkey in the Mediterranean energy context, aims to provide a comprehensive framework of understanding of the growing strategic relevance of Turkey for both the European Union and the overall Euro-Mediterranean region. In particular, the paper focuses on the EU-Turkey energy relations and outlines the crucial role of natural gas in enhancing energy cooperation between the two players. In 2010 about 80% of EU gas imports derived from only three suppliers: Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria. This heavy dependence on such a few suppliers stimulated the European Commission to make the concept of diversification a cornerstone of its energy policy and to launch the concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, an initiative aimed to develop a natural gas transit corridor from Caspian and Middle Eastern gas-rich regions to Europe, in order to ease the dependency on the natural gas imported from the Russian Federation. An initiative that could shift the centre of gravity of the regional gas transit from the north to the south of the Black Sea, allowing Turkey to become a key transit country in the future European gas market; a pivotal element in the European gas security of supply architecture. Furthermore, the paper also considers the enormous renewable energy potential of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, to which Turkey could greatly contribute in terms of technology transfer and manufacturing know-how. Turkey's involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean offers a great opportunity for energy cooperation both between the EU and Turkey and within the overall Euro-Mediterranean region. Such large-scale renewable energy projects could greatly contribute to the economic development of the overall Mediterranean region, and also to its social and political stability. Considering the lack of a wide and comprehensive EU-Turkey energy cooperation scheme, the paper proposes a series of policy priorities pointed to enhance this bilateral relationship and also the wider Euro-Mediterranean integration process.