Suchergebnisse

Der Autor beschreibt und analysiert die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten in Rußland. Kernpunkte der Ideologie bilden die imperiale Idee, ein Neo-Eurasismus, eine dezidiert antiwestliche Haltung und die Vorstellung eines "Dritten Wegs". Abschließend werden die aus diesen ideologischen Grundlagen abgeleiteten sozialpolitischen Konzepte betrachtet. (BIOst-Srt)

The first disagreements between Russia's Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada emerged in the spring and summer of 1917, right after the proclamation of the Rada's First Universal and the formation of the Ukrainian executive body, the General Secretariat. The arrival in Kiev in July 1917 of the Russian governmental delegation, consisting of Alexander Kerensky, Irakly Tsereteli and Mikhail Tereshchenko, and the attempts to work out a compromise—which found their embodiment in the Second Universal—led, in fact, to the political crisis in Petrograd. The majority of the Kadet ministers refused to approve the results of the negotiations in Kiev and tendered their resignations.

İdız, S.: The Turkish-Armenian debacle. - S. 11-19 Minasyan, S.: Prosepcts for normalization between Armenia and Turkey : a view from Yerevan. - S. 21-30 Torbakov, I.: Russia and Turkish-Armenian normalization : competing interests in the South Caucasus. - S. 31-39 Mehtiyev, E.: Turkish-Armenian protocols : an Azerbaijani perspective. - S. 41-47

"Moscow's increasingly assertive behavior has given rise to intensive speculation as to
what the ultimate goals of Russia's foreign policy are. Basically, the question that needs
to be answered is: What does Russia want?
I would argue that it is impossible to understand the logic of Russia's international conduct without investigating the intimate and intricate link between the country's domestic
politics and its foreign policy. The intent thus is to place a special emphasis on studying
how the nature of Russia's socio-political system influences Moscow's policies in the
international arena.
I start off with postulating a thesis that, ultimately, the goal of Russian foreign policy
efforts is to create conditions for preserving and perpetuating the current political and
economic regime, while seeking to attain its legitimation by the international community. Specifically, this means that the Kremlin's three-pronged objective is: to secure the
persistence of a system of authoritarian rule and of bureaucratic capitalism; to have
this system recognized as valid in its own right—being equal (or even superior) to the
Western liberal model; and to integrate Russian economy into the global system while
shielding the domestic policies from the "pernicious" outside influences.
My second thesis is that it is precisely the nature of Russia's socio-political system that
makes Moscow's policies both towards the West and its ex-Soviet neighbors within the
common neighborhood inconsistent and contradictory. Since the specific characteristics
of Russia's regime make integration with Western/EU institutions all but impossible,
the Kremlin leadership proclaims Russia's strategic independence.
The intent to cast Russia as an independent pole inevitably compels the Kremlin leadership to focus on the country's immediate strategic neighborhood—what has famously been
called the sphere of Russia's "privileged interests"—where Russia seeks leadership and
closer integration. But paradoxically, the seeming affinity between the authoritarian regime
in Russia and those in most East European countries appears to be the main factor preventing successful integration. The thing is that authoritarian power simply cannot be delegated.
This explains why Russia ends up being faced with the seemingly intractable attraction-
assertion dilemma. Being unable to integrate its neighbors, Russia seeks to aggressively
assert itself and its interests. But Moscow's increasingly muscular policies seem to contradict Russia's stated intention to attract allies and cast itself as an appealing socio-economic model to be emulated by the like-minded partners." [author's abstract]