Irreversible Investments, Dynamic Inconsistency and Policy Convergence
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1910
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1910
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In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 377-404
ISSN: 1537-5307
In: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 1003-1030
ISSN: 1539-2988
In: International journal of social welfare, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 77-85
ISSN: 1468-2397
AbstractThe activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide 'reasonable' activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients' personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they impose. We find that caseworkers are sensitive to personal responsibility, varying the motivation for not fulfilling the activation requirement from a case where the client has less control (circumstances) to one with more control (choice) more than doubles sanctions.
In: NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 16/2019
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5875
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4309
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4374
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In: Søkelys på arbeidslivet, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 147-166
ISSN: 1504-7989
In: CESifo working paper series 4406
In: Public finance
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.
In: Economica, Band 91, Heft 361, S. 142-162
ISSN: 1468-0335
AbstractThis paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavioural effect in a regression discontinuity analysis with the risk score as the forcing variable. We find that taxpayers at the margin had a significant reduction in self‐reported deductions in the next years' tax filing. The behavioural effect over a three‐year post‐audit period is estimated to be of a magnitude similar to that of the direct adjustment of the audit. This compliance effect does not change when we include the reporting of the spouse. We find that the risk score threshold that maximizes net public revenue from the audits is considerably below current practice.
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7616
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Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.
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Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5565
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Working paper