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Proponents of electoral quotas have a 'dependent interpretation' of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice.

First published online : 19 May 2016 ; Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl's polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of democracy and, consequently, one-party dominance is classified as an 'inclusive hegemony' outside his conception of democracy. For procedural definitions of democracy, however, dominant party systems are legitimate outcomes of electoral competition provided that there have been no formal restrictions to the exercise of civil and political rights. The article examines the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism, broadens the notion of authoritarian controls to include soft manipulative practices and explains why government contestability should be regarded as a constitutive property of democracy.

Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl's polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of democracy and, consequently, one-party dominance is classified as an 'inclusive hegemony' outside his conception of democracy. For procedural definitions of democracy, however, dominant party systems are legitimate outcomes of electoral competition provided that there have been no formal restrictions to the exercise of civil and political rights. The article examines the boundaries between democracy and authoritarianism, broadens the notion of authoritarian controls to include soft manipulative practices and explains why government contestability should be regarded as a constitutive property of democracy.

First published online : 11 November 2015 ; How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron–client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.

How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron–client relations and the context of collective action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation in policy-making processes.

Is age a suitable case for electoral quotas on the same grounds invoked for women in politics? If affirmative action should not be arbitrarily applied to a few social groups, we must specify the conditions that could serve as a benchmark which a group must pass in order to qualify for its application. Drawing from the literature on women in politics, this article sets up empirical indicators to examine the political under-representation of younger and older age groups: whether the age-related pattern of political under-representation is linked to stereotypes and bias that negatively affect its engagement in politics, and whether these age groups face special issues that give them a unique perspective, which only those who directly experience them can fully advocate in decision-making fora. Affirmative action raises questions about the boundaries of identity, the limits of politics as a vehicle for social change and the meaning of electoral choice.

The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the democratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question is particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that heavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively open structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread practice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the impact of clientelism on political competitiveness in order to sort out the position of these regimes along the lines of democracy and authoritarianism? This task requires identifying the conditions under which clientelism becomes an essentially authoritarian practice and qualifies these regimes as such. The article puts forward two propositions about the circumstances under which clientelism infringes basic democratic standards under a thin and a thick definition of democracy. Clientelism under one-party monopoly engenders authoritarianism when it thwarts and punishes the contesting voice of citizens by effectively blocking exit from its incentives and sanctions.

Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This problem may exhibit a distinct pattern in a clientelist system, when the affected groups are client groups attached to political party networks. The case of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990–93) illustrates that collective reaction to reforms that hurt client groups affects primarily the internal structure of the clientelist parties, their alliance with client groups and, thereby, their relative capacity for political mobilisation. This pattern makes certain types of economic reform, such as privatisation and structural reforms, particularly risky for governments in a clientelist system.