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This article sketches the key political dimensions of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, focusing particularly on the central importance that he placed on freedom of information as a necessary condition for the effective monitoring of public officials by civil society groups and individual citizens. Section one introduces Bentham as a pivotal radical thinker of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Section two outlines the critical dimensions of Bentham's political theory, particularly the need to debunk metaphorical and obscure language so as to enable citizens to understand the real forces and interests at work in their world. Section three turns to his later constitutional theory, emphasizing its radically democratic elements. Section four focuses on Bentham's theory of open government, emphasizing its reliance on public scrutiny of the actions of office-holders, a function that he assigned to what he called the Public Opinion Tribunal. Section five analyzes the place that he ascribed to personal privacy through a discussion of his liberal attitude to sexual practices. Section six reflects on the cogency and contemporary relevance of Bentham's theory.

This article sketches the key political dimensions of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, focusing particularly on the central importance that he placed on freedom of information as a necessary condition for the effective monitoring of public officials by civil society groups and individual citizens. Section two outlines the critical dimensions of Bentham's political theory, particularly the need to debunk metaphorical and obscure language so as to enable citizens to understand the real forces and interests at work in their world. Section three turns to his later constitutional theory, emphasising its radically-democratic elements. Section four focuses on Bentham's theory of open government, emphasizing its reliance on public scrutiny of the actions of office-holders, a function that he assigned to what he called the Public Opinion Tribunal. Section five analyses the place that he ascribed to personal privacy through a discussion of his liberal attitude to sexual practices. Section six reflects on the cogency and contemporary relevance of Bentham's theory.

This article analyses the theory of sexuality, personality and politics developed by the literary critic John Addington Symonds (1840-93). Sections one and two introduce Symonds' changing reputation as a modernist theorist of 'sexual inversion' (homosexuality). Section three examines his conceptualisation of the processes whereby an individual can sublimate sexual urges to create a harmonious and unalienated personality which acknowledges the need to combine transgressive self-expression with social convention. Section four demonstrates how this theory led Symonds to endorse an eroticised form of democratic socialism, while section five explores the culmination of Symonds' thought in a form of pantheistic idealism. This research is significant in that it extends our understanding of socialism and sexuality into areas that are marginalised and yet historically important.

Together with utilitarianism, British idealism dominated Anglo-American philosophy from the 1870s until the end of the First World War. This article counters a persisting criticism of the British idealists: that they endorsed the allegedly oppressive and static theory of the state associated with German idealists, especially J. G. Fichte. The article introduces the British idealists' reputation as Fichtean collectivists and provides an overview of leading current interpretations of Fichte's political thought. It then analyses T. H. Green's use of Fichtean terminology against the background of Fichte's reception in Britain in the 1860s and 1870s. Edward Caird's interpretation of - and alternative to - Fichte's socialism is analysed, followed by an examination of the readings of William Wallace and Bernard Bosanquet. It is concluded that these British idealists rejected the alleged Fichtean centralism for which they have been condemned, and did so on grounds that retain force in contemporary debates between Fichte scholars. Adapted from the source document.

Together with utilitarianism, British idealism dominated Anglo-American philosophy from the 1870s until the end of the First World War. This article counters a persisting criticism of the British idealists: that they endorsed the allegedly oppressive and static theory of the state associated with German idealists, especially J. G. Fichte. The article introduces the British idealists' reputation as Fichtean collectivists and provides an overview of leading current interpretations of Fichte's political thought. It then analyses T. H. Green's use of Fichtean terminology against the background of Fichte's reception in Britain in the 1860s and 1870s. Edward Caird's interpretation of — and alternative to — Fichte's socialism is analysed, followed by an examination of the readings of William Wallace and Bernard Bosanquet. It is concluded that these British idealists rejected the alleged Fichtean centralism for which they have been condemned, and did so on grounds that retain force in contemporary debates between Fichte scholars.

This article analyses the drafting of the document eventually printed as the Nineteen Propositions. Section two addresses certain issues regarding the methods and concepts employed in the subsequent analysis, focusing on consensus‐building, constitutional leanings and the drafting of parliamentary declarations in early 1642. Section three examines the origins of the Nineteen Propositions in the draft Declaration of Ways and Means (January 1642) (hereafter cited as the Ways). Section four traces the emergence of the Declaration Concerning Grievances and Remedies (hereafter cited as the Grievances) from the Ways (January–February). Section five examines the junta's efforts to overcome the Lords' prevarication over passing the Grievances (February–May). Section six examines the emergence of the initial draft of the Nineteen Propositions from the Grievances (24–7 May). Section seven analyses the 28 May draft, while section eight explores the amendment of that draft (31 May and 1 June). Section nine examines parliament's abortive attempts to revise the Nineteen Propositions in light of His Majesty's Answer to the XIX Propositions (21 June–2 July). It is concluded that, contrary to the received view, the text of the Nineteen Propositions began to emerge in January rather than May 1642, and that the junta in the Commons rather than the Lords drove this process. The three appendices identify, respectively, the constitutional leanings of the relevant parliamentarians, the parts of the text of the Ways that were repeated in the Grievances, and dates on which the various parts of the final text of the Nineteen Propositions were written.

This article analyses the drafting of the document eventually printed as the Nineteen Propositions. Section two addresses certain issues regarding the methods and concepts employed in the subsequent analysis, focusing on consensus-building, constitutional leanings and the drafting of parliamentary declarations in early 1642. Section three examines the origins of the Nineteen Propositions in the draft Declaration of Ways and Means (January 1642) (hereafter cited as the Ways). Section four traces the emergence of the Declaration Concerning Grievances and Remedies (hereafter cited as the Grievances) from the Ways (January–February). Section five examines the junta's efforts to overcome the Lords' prevarication over passing the Grievances (February–May). Section six examines the emergence of the initial draft of the Nineteen Propositions from the Grievances (24–7 May). Section seven analyses the 28 May draft, while section eight explores the amendment of that draft (31 May and 1 June). Section nine examines parliament's abortive attempts to revise the Nineteen Propositions in light of His Majesty's Answer to the XIX Propositions (21 June–2 July). It is concluded that, contrary to the received view, the text of the Nineteen Propositions began to emerge in January rather than May 1642, and that the junta in the Commons rather than the Lords drove this process. The three appendices identify, respectively, the constitutional leanings of the relevant parliamentarians, the parts of the text of the Ways that were repeated in the Grievances, and dates on which the various parts of the final text of the Nineteen Propositions were written.

The article presents a model of performative agency in capitalist societies. The first section reconsiders the problem of third-dimensional power as developed by Steven Lukes, focusing on the relationships between universal human needs and social forms. The second section uses the concepts of the 'self', 'I' and 'person' to characterize the relationships between human nature, affect, individual alienation, social institutions and personal judgement. Alienation is argued to be inherent in human agency, rather than being solely created by capitalism. The next section applies this analysis within an agonal theory of civil society that is driven by the individual's performative participation in associations that compete within institutional settings. Finally the article considers the political ramifications of this model, rejecting contemporary constitutionalist approaches in favour of a revised form of pluralist associationalism. Throughout, the article warns of the dangerous marginalization of emotions (or 'affect') by excessively self-conscious, rationalist approaches such as Mead's social theory, liberal universalism and even some performative theories.

Purpose: The paper establishes that Edward Caird developed a distinctive form of liberal Hegelianism out of his critical responses to Kant, the romantic tradition of Rousseau, Goethe and Wordsworth and indeed Hegel himself. Design/methodology/approach: The paper presents a philosophical reconstruction of Caird's social economics that is based on a close reading of a very wide range of Caird's writings including his recently published lectures on social ethics and political economy. Findings: Caird's theory of historical development underpinned his writings on social economics. One of his greatest debts in this regard was to his interpretation of the romantics, which introduced a rich conception of higher human capacities into his critical analysis of capitalism. When combined with his critique of Kantian formalism, this led Caird towards Hegel. Yet, Caird's concerns regarding corporatism's stultifying tendencies led him to develop a dynamic form of liberal Hegelianism, which placed far greater trust than had Hegel in the ability of free conscientious citizens to restructure and enrich established social categories (classes, professions, gender roles and so on) and the system of nations which those categories helped to constitute. Practical implications: If Caird's liberal Hegelianism were to be adopted today, we could live in much freer, fairer and enriching communities than we do at present. Originality/value: Edward Caird has been wrongly neglected in intellectual histories of Anglo-American political theory, and while his writings on Kant's critical philosophy have received some scholarly attention, his critique of romanticism has never received the attention it deserves. This also draws on manuscripts that have been published only within the past five years, having been edited for the first time by the author of this paper.