Partisan Moods: Polarization and the Dynamics of Mass Party Preferences
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 1, S. 277-292
ISSN: 0022-3816
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 1, S. 277-292
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 1, S. 277-291
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 9, Heft 2
ISSN: 1540-8884
The notion of "starving the beast" has been an important justification for fiscal programs emphasizing revenue reductions since the mid-1970s. While the idea of restraining government spending by limiting government revenues has an intuitive appeal, there is convincing evidence the reducing federal tax rates without coordinated reductions in federal spending actually produces long-term growth in spending. This perverse result is explained by a theory of "fiscal illusion." By deferring the costs of government services and benefits through deficit financing, starve the beast policies have the effect of lowering the perceived price of government in the minds of many citizens. We assess the principal behavioral prediction of the fiscal illusion theory.Incorporating estimates of the effects of federal deficits into a standard substantive model of Stimson's mood index, we find strong support for a subjective price-driven theory of demand for government. In particular, we find that the size of the federal budget deficit is significantly associated with greater demand for government services and benefits. This may have important implications for contemporary debates about fiscal discipline.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 939-956
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 939-957
ISSN: 0022-3816
SSRN
Working paper
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 785-794
A variety of measures indicate that income inequality has grown significantly in the United States during the last three decades (APSA 2004; Brandolini and Smeeding 2006). In a flurry of recent research, scholars have attributed this trend to the failure of the national government to represent the preferences of ordinary citizens in general and less wealthy citizens in particular (APSA 2004; Bartels 2004; 2006; Gilens 2005), who participate in politics less consistently and contribute fewer resources to political candidates than their wealthier peers (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The American Political Science Association's (APSA) Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy summarizes this representative failure hypothesis: "disparities in participation ensure that ordinary Americans speak in a whisper while the most advantaged roar" (2004, 2).
SSRN
Working paper
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 785-794
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 77, Heft 3, S. 818-832
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 77, Heft 3, S. 818-832
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 105-127
Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public's relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008-2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 105-127
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 105-127
ISSN: 1460-3667
Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public's relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008–2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances.