Suchergebnisse

The conventional wisdom emphasizes agency slack or bias as the central problem of international delegation. I show that the possibility of a unilateral influence contest is equally problematic. States can exert unilateral influence on autonomous international bureaucrats, either through rewards or through punishments, to pursue their particular interests. A costly contest results, so some states could refuse to delegate because they expect others to be too influential. The analysis has four counterintuitive empirical implications. First, international agreements often favor institutionally weak states that are disadvantaged in the unilateral influence contest. Second, states could limit the autonomy of an international organization even if this prompts bad policies. Third, a state can sometimes profitably exchange distributional concessions for autonomy. Finally, constraints on unilateral influence are possible only if a disadvantaged state can credibly commit to compensating an advantaged state for it. A central broader contribution of the analysis is to show how power politics influences the rational design of international institutions.

If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country's bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments. Adapted from the source document.

The consequences of global warming are uncertain and possibly irreversible. In this article, I investigate the value of early mitigation action given these uncertainties and irreversibilities. I complement standard economic techniques with a political analysis: in the model, an incumbent government may be replaced through elections or other means by another policymaker with very different preferences. I find that if a green policymaker (very concerned about global warming) is probably replaced by a brown policymaker (mildly concerned about global warming), the case for early mitigation action is even stronger than otherwise. Thus, if environmentally aware governments will gain power in major emitter countries, they have particularly strong incentives to negotiate a global climate treaty when they expect that their successor may be less interested in climate cooperation. Similarly, concerns about the preferences of future policymakers could motivate environmentally aware local policymakers to impose increasingly stringent climate policies.

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow a government with incentives to promote the public good by conditioning political support on the consequences of international cooperation. Contravening the conventional wisdom, democratic accountability effectively shapes international cooperation. Since international cooperation is reciprocal, domestic democratic accountability also influences the behavior of foreign governments, even if they are autocratic. Empirically, democratic accountability in one country increases the expected dyadic level of international cooperation if and only if the expected social benefits to that country are substantial enough. However, the analysis also reveals that democracies might sometimes obtain a higher payoff from cooperation with autocracies that do not have democratic accountability mechanisms. These findings indicate that the democratic propensity for international cooperation is a contingent phenomenon.

Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms to reduce the cost of international cooperation, enforcement concerns prompt gradualism. First, to achieve ambitious international cooperation, states must internationally enforce costly domestic reform. Second, defection at the reform stage is particularly pernicious. When other states reform, their ability to punish the defector by suspending cooperation is reduced. States choose the extent of reform to maximize the benefits of expected international cooperation in the future. As collective enforcement power increases or the number of states decreases, the extent and pace of reform increase. Gradualism is also most probable in international public good provision because excludable benefits mitigate enforcement problems.