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The European extreme right has been understood as a monolithic entity regarding its Euroscepticism. Contrary to this, it is demonstrated in this article that in fact the extreme right adopts varying positions on Europe. Theoretically, party positions on Europe are conceptualised as a three-fold dimension, namely positions on first the principle, second the practice, and third the future of EU cooperation. From this, three types of Euroscepticism are identified. First, the 'rejecting' type comprising parties against all abovementioned dimensions. Second, the 'conditional' type containing parties not against the principle of EU cooperation but against its practice and its future. Third, the 'compromising' type including parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU cooperation but opposing further integration. In accounting for this diversity, the article concludes that first, the parties displaying strong authoritarian values reject Europe regardless of their economic policy. Second, the parties refraining from 'rejecting' Euroscepticism support centrist and capitalist economic policies displaying comparatively less authoritarian values.

Nationalism and globalisation are two central phenomena of the modern world, that have both shaped and been shaped by each other, yet few connections have been made systematically between the two. This book brings together leading international scholars to examine the effect of globalisation on nationalism, and how the persistence of the nation affects globalisation. With a range of case studies from Europe, the US and Asia, the authors focus on the interaction between globalisation, national identity, national sovereignty, state-formation and the economy. Part one provides theoretical reflections on the flexibility and plasticity of the terms nationalism and globalisation focusing on the ways in which nationalism has shaped and has been shaped by globalising forces. Part two examines the relationship between nationalism and globalisation in different historical eras and different regions, questioning established approaches. Part three focuses on contemporary issues including the economic crisis, labour migration and citizenship and the theme of global culture. The result is a highly topical account that considers the conceptual landscape of Nationalism and Globalisation. With an interdisciplinary approach, Nationalism and Globalisation will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, sociology, history, economics and international relations.

AbstractWe argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that to understand the electoral fortunes of far-right parties in Western Europe, we need to consider the advantages and disadvantages these parties encounter in the multidimensional political issue space. We argue that salience changes among the electorate benefit far-right parties more than shifting far-right parties' policy positions. We further posit that changes in the public salience of European integration are more important for far-right success than other issues -- including immigration. Utilizing similar survey questions from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) about parties' positions and the European Election Studies (EES) about voters' policy preferences, we estimate multidimensional voting models in 12 West European countries. We then use mathematical simulations to show that the issue that matters most for far-right success is European integration. This research has important implications for the study of electoral competition, parties' campaign strategies, and voting behavior.

AbstractObjectiveThis study demonstrates that voting for the far right has a central affective dimension within the domain of immigration, the effect of which relies on the level of trust one has toward political institutions and equally colors one's estimation of threat.MethodsWe use representative data from two studies across three countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) at two time points (2015 and 2019).ResultsWe first show that anger, rather than fear, constitutes the emotional mechanism underpinning the relationship between anti‐immigration attitudes and support for the far right. Second, anger is associated more strongly with far‐right voting among those with lower levels of political trust. Third, anger affects how individuals seek out and process information about immigration, resulting in the overestimation of the perceived threat.ConclusionThese findings shed light on a key puzzle of electoral behavior: Why do some citizens with anti‐immigrant attitudes opt for radical politics, whereas others do not.

What is the effect of politicisation on EU representation? We empirically test two competing views through a focus on party-voter congruence, i.e. whether parties share the policy preferences of their voters. The first perspective expects that the process of politicisation –either through party or media contestation– would improve party-voter agreement. The second perspective argues that politicisation has not improved the supply of partisan debate with parties still not offering satisfactory options to voters who are primarily driven by protest-based considerations; and as such does not expect an effect. We analyse congruence on the left-right and pro-anti-EU dimensions, capturing questions related to EU policy and polity, respectively. Our examination of four European Parliament elections (1999-2014) and 341 parties across 53 electoral contexts points to the limited effect of politicisation upon representation. Our findings have significant implications for the study of EU politicisation and representation and open up avenues for future research.

Existing research has primarily focused on the role of utility and identity in shaping individuals' European Union (EU) preferences. This article argues that macroeconomic context is a crucial predictor of attitudes towards transnational financial assistance, which has been omitted from previous analyses. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28 EU member states, this article demonstrates that citizens living in poorer EU countries are less willing to support fiscal solidarity than their counterparts in more affluent countries. Country affluence serves as a heuristic, moderating the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considerations and willingness to show solidarity to member states with economic difficulties. When a country does not fare well economically, citizens' views on providing help to others remain negative, irrespective of individual-level utilitarian and identity considerations. Our findings have implications for understanding the decision-making calculus underlying preference formation.