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AbstractWhat happens after primary elections? Strategies of loyalty or defection in general elections have been addressed by US literature mainly by means of aggregate data. However, we lack similar studies in non-US contexts. This article investigates the strategies followed after primary elections by taking the case of the Italian Partito Democratico as an illustration. We addressed the individual drivers of loyalty or defection strategies by considering three different dimensions: (1) the outcome of the primary election, having backed a winning or losing candidate; (2) the strength of partisanship, meant as ideological congruence with the party and partisan involvement; and (3) the leader effect. We relied on four surveys (exit polls) administered during party leadership selections held in 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2019. The results suggest that all three dimensions have an influence on post-primary strategies, but what counts the most is partisan involvement.

In the lead-up to the 2013 parliamentary election, four Italian parties used primaries to select candidates. Primaries, which were autonomously decided upon by the parties' central offices, have operated according to different rules. These quasi-experimental circumstances allow an assessment of the effects of rules and selectors' predispositions in the promotion of legislator renewal. An examination of three aspects of renewal-gender balance, rejuvenation and turnover-found that party leaderships sometimes deliberately pursued renewal through biased rules. The cases in point are Partito Democratico and Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà regarding gender balance, and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) regarding turnover. Moreover, even when unconstrained by the rules, selectors have pushed for renewal, as shown by the rise in female representation in the M5S. In general, primary elections have demonstrated to be renewalfriendly. However, it remains unclear whether this is an idiosyncratic effect connected to a single election, or a general tendency due to the characteristics of primary voters.

1. Introduction : primary elections across the world / Giulia Sandri and Antonella Seddone -- 2. Leadership selection versus candidate selection : similarities and differences / Ofer Kenig, Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan -- 3. The American experience of primary elections in comparative perspective / Alan Ware -- 4. Democratising party leadership selection in Spain and Portugal / Oscar Barbera, Marco Lisi and Juan Rodriguez Teruel -- 5. Democratising party leadership selection in Belgium and Israel / Bram Wauters, Gideon Rahat and Ofer Kenig -- 6. Democratising party leadership selection in Japan and Taiwan / Yohei Narita, Ryo Nakai and Keiichi Kubo -- 7. Democratising candidate selection in Italy and France / Marino De Luca and Fulvio Venturino -- 8. Democratising candidate selection in Romania and Slovakia / Sergiu Gherghina and Peter Spac -- 9. Democratising candidate selection in Iceland / Indridi H. Indriason and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson -- 10. Conclusion / Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino.

In this article, we investigate the case of the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico - PD). We look at how members and sympathizers are integrated within the party and their respective role in selecting the leader. The PD applies a two-step procedure for selecting its party leaders. First, enrolled members are able to screen the candidates running for party leadership, so that only three candidates are entitled progress to the following step. Second, the party leader is selected via open primaries where all electors are admitted. We aim to assess if these highly inclusive procedures allowing party members and sympathizers to have a say together in leader selections may breed any strain between the two selectorates. To do so, we separately focus on the level of competitiveness of the races successively involving members and then sympathizers. We rely on four different datasets including aggregate data at the regional level about selections for the party leader organized in 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2019. Results show that the two selectorates have only partially converged along the same lines. In fact, a downward trend affects both closed and open primaries; instead, the vote by party members often results in competitive closed primaries, while open primaries are more likely to generate plebiscitary results. This may produce important consequences on the different role of members and sympathizers within the party. ; En este artículo investigamos el caso del Partido Demócrata en Italia (Partito Democratico - PD). Observamos cómo los miembros y simpatizantes se integran dentro del partido y su papel respectivo en la selección del líder. El PD aplica un procedimiento de dos pasos para seleccionar a los líderes. Primero, los afiliados seleccionan a los candidatos que se postulan para el liderazgo del partido, de modo que solo tres candidatos tienen derecho a pasar a la siguiente etapa. En segundo lugar, el líder se selecciona mediante primarias abiertas en las que se admite el voto de todos los electores. Nuestro objetivo es evaluar si estos procedimientos altamente inclusivos que permiten a afiliados y simpatizantes tener voz y voto en la selección de líderes pueden generar alguna tensión entre los dos electorados. Para ello, nos centramos en el nivel de competitividad de las primarias que involucran, sucesivamente, a afiliados y simpatizantes. Nos basamos en cuatro conjuntos de datos diferentes que incluyen datos agregados a nivel regional sobre los procesos de selección del líder nacional del partido organizados en 2009, 2013, 2017 y 2019. Los resultados muestran que los dos procesos solo han convergido parcialmente. De hecho, tanto las primarias cerradas como las abiertas se caracterizan por una tendencia a la baja; en cambio, el voto de los afiliados a menudo permite primarias cerradas competitivas, mientras que las primarias abiertas tienen más probabilidades de generar resultados plebiscitarios. Esto puede producir importantes consecuencias sobre el papel diferente de los miembros y simpatizantes dentro del partido.

Abstract
Several scholars of populism have pointed out that populist parties rely very oft en on so-called charismatic leadership (Canovan, 1981; McDonnell, 2015). While the rise of populist parties in Europe in the last decade is quite evident and well-studied, what remains understudied is how this phenomenon interacts with other transformations that are currently shaping parties and party systems in European democracies. In particular, what is the interplay between the rise of populism, political leadership and personalization of politics? This link between populism and leadership could be understood in the light of the change occurring within party organizations, and internal party democratization in particular (Musella, 2015; Pogunkte and Webb, 2007; Karvonen, 2010; Scarrow et al. 2017). Following these studies underlining a close relationship between populism, leadership and inclusive leadership selection methods, in this paper we aim at empirically exploring how the personalization and democratization of organizational patterns affect the role of the leader in populist parties. To what extent does the use of inclusive selection methods of party leaders within populist parties affect the scope of their organizational power and strengthens the party's personalization patterns? To explore this research question, we focus on a case study, the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy as an empirical illustration and we rely on original survey data, on aggregated electoral data as well as on primary and secondary data on party organizational rules.