Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes inter-generational continuity and cultural reproduction in three transitional countries: Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic. We compare the levels of internalization of factor structures of self-identification and values among young people and older generations. We focus specifically on a comparison of young people representing the two main ethno-linguistic groups in Estonia and Latvia: ethnic Estonians, or Latvians, and Russians. The data are derived from representative population surveys carried out in the three countries in November 2005 and spring 2006. In general, we observed greater inter-generational continuity in the Czech Republic, compared with Estonia and Latvia. Cultural reproduction among the ethnic minorities in both Baltic countries has been most vulnerable to transitional changes: Russian youngsters differ from their parents to a greater extent than do young Estonians and Latvians from theirs.

Based on the concept of transition culture, the article discusses patterns of generational continuity and disruption in post-Soviet Estonia. We suggest a tool for meso-level analysis: factor structures of self-identification and value orientations. The empirical analysis of population survey data collected in 2005 shows that such mental structures have significant correlations with indices of perceptions about social changes and everyday social and cultural practices. Our analysis focuses on mental patterns of three generations among two main ethno-linguistic groups: ethnic Estonians and the Russian minority. The results reveal considerable differentiation between older and younger generations. We suggest that post-Soviet transition has brought about generational disruption in cultural reproduction, which is particularly visible among the ethnic minority group: Russian youngsters differ from their parents to a greater extent than do young Estonians from theirs. Moreover, the mental patterns of young Estonians and Russians have common elements.

The paper will focus on the structures of collective identities of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. Particular cultural and political orientations held by individuals and frequencies of self-categorization as Russian, ex-Soviet, citizens of Estonia, etc. have been discussed extensively. Much less attention has been paid to the structures of self-identification, which draw out people's thinking patterns. The paper is based on the methodological premise that analysis and interpretation of the disposition of different types of self-categorization is worth the effort, as it helps to elucidate the general meta-structures behind people's interpretation of different identification narratives and provides an opportunity to make prognoses about future scenarios.

This article looks at how young people in post-communist Estonia attribute meaning to consumer goods and to the development of consumption during the last decade. The empirical material comprises 45 qualitatively analysed student essays and 25 in-depth interviews. The authors arrange the material onto two main axes: the temporal axis of Estonian transformation and the spatial axis of Estonia (including the memory of Soviet Estonia) versus today's construct of the West. Also, we look at how `Western-ness' as a socio-cultural reference point is used by young people in representing consumption. We argue that the decoding of Western consumer culture is ambivalent for Estonian youth as it brings up national collective ideals of freedom as well as highly individual distinction-seeking. Value references ranging from more traditional to `post-modern' are inextricably interwoven in representations of today's consumption processes. Plural processes are at work among the studied students: having a strong desire to distance oneself from the Soviet heritage and to view `Western-ness' as the only alternative, while at the same time criticizing the adoption of the Western consumer capitalist model. This is manifested in a willingness to `outsmart' the Western consumer by using experiences from the Soviet period as well as Estonian ethnocultural heritage.

Die Mediennutzung in Estland hat sich als resistent erwiesen gegen die Etablierung des Estnischen als gemeinsamer Sprache im öffentlichen Raum. Bis zum heutigen Tag nutzt die russischsprachige Minderheit Estlands meist Medien in russischer Sprache. Die Sprachgrenze zeigt sich auch in den Praktiken der inhaltlichen Wahl gruppenspezifischer Medien sowie auf staatlicher Ebene (Republik Estland vs. Russische Föderation). Somit ist die Informationssphäre nicht nur in sprachlich, sondern auch inhaltlich in unterschiedliche Subsysteme aufgeteilt.Qualitative Studien zeigen, dass verschiedene Bottom-up- und Top-down- Mechanismen diese zweisprachige und ideologisch heterogene Informationssphäre stets neu reproduzieren. Die sprachlich und politisch gespaltene öffentliche Informationssphäre sieht sich ständig dem Dilemma gegenüber, einerseits Zugang zu praktischen und ideologischen Informationen zu gewährleisten und andererseits die Nationalsprache zu etablieren. Die estnischen Machteliten versuchen beide, oft widersprüchlichen Ziele zu erreichen. Wir diskutieren diesbezügliche Strategien unter dem Gesichtspunkt sowohl sprachzentrierter Nationsbildung als auch der Vielfalt globalisierten Medienkonsums.

The goal of this article is to identify the lacunae in recent research about post-Communist transformations in the Baltic states, a task for which sociology as a social-scientific discipline is uniquely qualified. The paper starts by periodising the two decades of post-Communist transformation which applies across all three Baltic states, providing evidence for a common Baltic way, with Estonia in a pioneering role. This is corroborated by quantitative evidence comparing post-Communist countries in terms of performance. According to received transitological wisdom, economic or political processes (shock therapy or anti-Communist revolution) were decisive factors in the early success of post-Communist transformation. In contrast, this article argues that economic and political explanations are insufficient in accounting for the running order between Baltic states, and calls instead for sociological explanations focusing on cultural differences described in terms of four orientations of the social imaginary and of social action – continuational, restitutive, emulative and innovative.