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The public choice model of urban residential location offers an opportunity to integrate economic and political models of migration, and thus has broad applicability as a positive model of both individual behavior and national policies relating to international migration. The authors describe the basic economic model of the urban migration process and explore its dynamics. They utilize this model to explain the migratory behavior of individuals and groups and the reactions of national governments, whether "sending" or "receiving" the migrants. Finally, they examine the policy implications of such a model.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Detailed Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I Introduction to Public Policy Analysis -- 1 Preview -- Reducing the U.S. Kidney Transplant Shortage -- Debriefing -- Write to Your Client -- Understand the Policy Problem -- Be Explicit About Values -- Specify Concrete Policy Alternatives -- Predict and Value Impacts -- Consider the Trade-Offs -- Make a Recommendation -- For Discussion -- 2 What Is Policy Analysis? -- Policy Analysis in Perspective -- Policy Analysis as a Profession -- A Closer Look at Analytical Functions -- Basic Preparation for Policy Analysis -- For Discussion -- 3 Toward Professional Ethics -- Analytical Roles -- Value Conflicts -- Ethical Code or Ethos? -- For Discussion -- PART II Conceptual Foundations for Problem Analysis -- 4 Efficiency and the Idealized Competitive Model -- The Efficiency Benchmark: The Competitive Economy -- Market Efficiency: The Meaning of Social Surplus -- Caveats: Models and Reality -- Conclusion -- For Discussion -- 5 Rationales for Public Policy: Market Failures -- Public Goods -- Externalities -- Natural Monopoly -- Information Asymmetry -- Conclusion -- For Discussion -- 6 Rationales for Public Policy: Other Limitations of the Competitive Framework -- Thin Markets: Few Sellers or Few Buyers -- The Source and Acceptability of Preferences -- The Problem of Uncertainty -- Intertemporal Allocation: Are Markets Myopic? -- Adjustment Costs -- Macroeconomic Dynamics -- Conclusion -- For Discussion -- 7 Rationales for Public Policy: Distributional and Other Goals -- Social Welfare beyond Pareto Efficiency -- Substantive Values Other Than Efficiency -- Some Cautions in Interpreting Distributional Consequences -- Choosing Distributional Values -- Instrumental Values

Often described as a public policy "bible," Weimer and Vining remains the essential primer it ever was. Now in its sixth edition, Policy Analysis provides a strong conceptual foundation of the rationales for and the limitations to public policy. It offers practical advice about how to do policy analysis, but goes a bit deeper to demonstrate the application of advanced analytical techniques through the use of case studies.

"With budgets squeezed at every level of government, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) holds outstanding potential for assessing the efficiency of many programs. In this first book to address the application of CBA to social policy, experts examine ten of the most important policy domains: early childhood development, elementary and secondary schools, health care for the disadvantaged, mental illness, substance abuse and addiction, juvenile crime, prisoner reentry programs, housing assistance, work-incentive programs for the unemployed and employers, and welfare-to-work interventions. Each contributor discusses the applicability of CBA to actual programs, describing both proven and promising examples. The editors provide an introduction to cost-benefit analysis, assess the programs described, and propose a research agenda for promoting its more widespread application in social policy. Investing in the Disadvantaged considers how to face America's most urgent social needs with shrinking resources, showing how CBA can be used to inform policy choices that produce social value"--Provided by publisher

One way for jurisdictions with limited analytic resources to increase their capability for doing cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is to use existing shadow prices, or "plug-ins", for important social impacts. This article contributes to the further development of one important shadow price: the value of an additional high school graduation in the United States. Specifically, how valuable to a student, government, and the rest of society in aggregate is a high school graduation? The analysis builds on the method developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy and presents numerical updates and extensions to their analysis. For the U.S., the estimated net present value (the social value) using a 3 percent real discount rate of this shadow price is approximately $300,000 per each additional graduate. In appropriate circumstances, this value can be "plugged-in" to CBAs of policies that either directly or indirectly seeks to increase the number of students who graduate from high school.

One way for jurisdictions with limited analytic resources to increase their capability for doing cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is to use existing shadow prices, or "plug-ins", for important social impacts. This article contributes to the further development of one important shadow price: the value of an additional high school graduation in the United States. Specifically, how valuable to a student, government, and the rest of society in aggregate is a high school graduation? The analysis builds on the method developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy and presents numerical updates and extensions to their analysis. For the U.S., the estimated net present value (the social value) using a 3 percent real discount rate of this shadow price is approximately $300,000 per each additional graduate. In appropriate circumstances, this value can be "plugged-in" to CBAs of policies that either directly or indirectly seeks to increase the number of students who graduate from high school.

AbstractPolicy designers seeking to harness profit‐driven efficiency for public purposes are increasingly creating organizations with fractionalized property rights that distribute "ownership" among public and private actors. The resulting hybrids are quite diverse, including mixed enterprises, public‐private partnerships, social entrepreneurship organizations, government‐sponsored enterprises, and various other hybrid forms. Marrying public purposes to private sector efficiency and strategic flexibility provides a tempting rationale for mixing public and private owners in hybrid organizations. Because public‐private hybrids involve fractionalized property rights, however, they exhibit tension among owners over both strategy and, more importantly, goals. To understand public‐private hybrids, we assess them in terms of six dimensions of property rights: fragmentation of ownership, clarity of allocation, cost of alienation, security from trespass, credibility of persistence, and autonomy (of both owners and managers). The unclear allocation of fractionalized ownership rights facilitates the appropriation of financial residuals and asset ownership opportunistically. Other weaknesses in the property rights configurations of public‐private hybrids create managerial dissonance or opportunistic behavior that typically leads to a narrowing of goals, but sometimes also to organizational failure.

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some 'rules for governments' concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.

This article provides eight rules for government concerning the administration of public—private partnerships (P3s). The basis for these rules draws on transaction cost economics. First, however, the article provides some background on alternative modes for the provision of infrastructure and their associated transactions costs. Second, it outlines a positive theory perspective of P3s that takes into account the divergent goals of the partners in a P3 (the profit maximization goals of private sector participants, and the budgetary and political goals of public sector participants). This section throws light on the adoption and outcomes of P3s. Third, it shows that many aspects of the theory are illustrated in the Metronet (the London Underground P3) case, which went bankrupt in 2007. Finally, the article proposes rules that governments should follow in the P3 process if they wish to avoid high transaction costs and poor P3 outcomes.