Suchergebnisse

Abstract
It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? In a companion paper (Voigt (2023). Journal of Institutional Economics, 20), I survey studies showing that geographical conditions can have direct and long-lasting effects on social norms. This paper goes one step further: It surveys studies that show how different geographical conditions affect both religious beliefs as well as traditions of family organization and how these, in turn, affect social norms.

Abstract
It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit 'emergency constitution', i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory—as applied by economists—can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution. This paper introduces a novel argument for justifying emergency constitutions. It argues that they can serve as a commitment mechanism protecting both citizens and politicians from overreacting to rare but significant threats.

In der Öffentlichkeit besteht Konsens darüber, dass das deutsche Rentensystem dringend reformiert werden muss, da das Verhaltnis von Beitragszahlern zu Rentnern immer ungünstiger werden wird. Die Regierungskommission "Verlasslicher Generationenvertrag" hat Ende Marz 2020 in ihrem Abschlussbericht vorgeschlagen, einen Alterssicherungsbeirat einzuführen. In diesem Beitrag wird gefragt, ob ein unabhangiges Gremium dabei helfen könnte, notwendige Reformen der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung zu realisieren, ohne dass Politiker deswegen um ihre Wiederwahl fürchten mussen. Der hier entwickelte Vorschlag geht deutlich über den der Rentenkommission hinaus. ; There is a broad consensus that Germany's pension system needs substantial reform. However, politicians shy away from this because they are afraid that it will cost them re-election. Here, an independent 'pension council' with far-reaching competences is proposed as a possible solution.

Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag wird der Vorschlag, die soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz zu verankern kritisch diskutiert. Nachdem kurz an die zentralen Funktionen von Verfassungen erinnert wird, werden drei Fragen diskutiert: (1) Kann die Aufnahme der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in das Grundgesetz zu einer wirksamen Beschränkung der relevanten Verfassungsakteure führen? (2) Inwieweit würde ein zusätzlicher Verfassungsartikel zu einer zusätzlichen Handlungsbeschränkung der relevanten Akteure führen? (3) Würde ein solcher Artikel dazu beitragen, die zentrale Funktion von Verfassungen besser zu erfüllen? Alle drei Fragen werden mit nein beantwortet und der Vorschlag wird somit abgelehnt.

The rule of law, a fundamental value of the European Union (EU), has come under stress in a number of its member states. The EU's response to these stresses has been criticized as politicized, slow, and unassertive. This research note develops a proposal to improve the current procedure.