Since 1997 arms transfers have declined by about 33%. For the period 1997-2001 the USA was the dominant supplier, accounting for nearly half of all deliveries. Russia was the second largest supplier for the period, but for 2001 Russia was the largest supplier. Taiwan was the largest recipient for 1997-2001. For 2001 the People's Republic of China was by far the largest recipient. For 1997-2001 the most important arms transfers in terms of volume were between Taiwan & the US, & China & Russia. The list of main suppliers & main recipients has changed little over the past 10 years. India & Pakistan are both major recipients of arms. They have received weapons or have weapon acquisition plans that could be destabilizing. On the other side of the scale, small imports of weapons have strongly influenced the course of the war in Sierra Leone & relations between West African countries. Competition has increased the importance of offsets, including technology transfers. The Joint Strike Fighter project may point to an unbalanced future transatlantic market. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 5 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.
Global arms transfers fell by 26% from 1999 to 2000, with the US accounting for almost 50% of the total. The process of a concentration of a few major arms suppliers & recipients continued. Among the largest suppliers, only Russia showed a substantial increase in arms transfers in 2000. The international arms market has become more commercial, competitive, & complicated. Suppliers have become both competitors & partners on the international arms market as recipients have learned how to use the market skillfully to receive "more for less." Economic, military-political, & technology factors in the arms supplier countries, combined with factors such as real or perceived military threats or countries that are in a phase of modernization, are more important determinants of arms transfers than national or international restrictive arms export policies. This raises questions as to the relationship between increasing national transparency in arms transfers & the democratic control of transfers. 12 Tables, 1 Figure. Adapted from the source document.
There has been an almost 50% increase in the volume of major conventional arms transfers over the past four years, reversing a downward trend after 1997. The USA and Russia were the largest suppliers in the five-year period 2002-2006, each accounting for around 30% of global deliveries. Exports from European Union (EU) members to non-EU countries accounted for just over 20% of global deliveries. Because of its very limited internal market, the Russian arms industry remains heavily dependent on exports -- most newly produced weapons in Russia are exported -- to maintain an arms industry and fund development of new weapons and technology. This limits the possibility that Russia will exercise restraint in its arms exports. The arms industries of the USA and EU members are in general far less export dependent. China and India remained the largest arms importers in the world. Also among the top 10 importers were five Middle Eastern countries. While much media attention was given to arms deliveries to Iran, mainly from Russia, deliveries from the USA and European countries to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were significantly larger. Especially worrisome are deliveries of long-range conventional strike systems to these states and the effects this may have on regional stability. Because the development of large weapon systems is becoming increasingly costly, nearly all countries have become or soon will become dependent on other countries for weapons or weapon technology. This could lead to mutual dependency -- as in US-Europe relations -- or to one-sided dependency, as is the case for most developing countries. Some countries may be unwilling to accept dependency or be unable to access arms and technology. They may try, at high economic cost, to become autonomous in arms production or may focus on relatively cheap alternative weapons such as weapons of mass destruction, or war-fighting strategies such as terrorism and IT warfare. The problem of controlling state supplies of weapons to rebel groups, while not new, was highlighted in 2006 by the arsenal acquired by Hezbollah from Iran and used in its war with Israel, and by serious breaches by state actors of the UN arms embargo on Somalia. Transparency in arms transfers, which in the 1990s saw significant improvement, with more and better national export reports, has remained stagnant in the past few years. Adapted from the source document.
Governments are increasingly aware that controlling flows of conventional arms and items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes -- dual-use items -- is a complex process involving regulation of exports and associated brokering, transit, trans-shipment and financing activities. This complexity requires effort and cooperation from countries around the world. States, therefore, engage in various multilateral mechanisms and continually create or adapt instruments to address these challenges. Adapted from the source document.
With the exception of some promising progress in South America and in South Eastern Europe, in 2011 most developments in conventional arms control were discouraging as states were not willing to modify national positions in order to facilitate agreement, either globally or regionally. Three factors have contributed to the difficulty of developing conventional arms control. First, the huge and sustained investment that the USA has made in its military power has made it impossible to find solutions based on balance. Second, technological developments have blurred the picture of which capabilities will confer military power now and in the future. Third, the lack of agreed rules about the use of force -- which may be for ostensibly constructive purposes and not only a defensive response to aggression -- makes countries reluctant to give up military capabilities even if there is a humanitarian argument in favour of restraint. Adapted from the source document.
