State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?
In: Public choice, Band 126, Heft 1-2, S. 177-199
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 126, Heft 1-2, S. 177-199
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 126, Heft 1, S. 177-200
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public Choice, Band 119, Heft 1/2, S. 143-159
In: Public choice, Band 119, Heft 1-2, S. 143-159
ISSN: 0048-5829
Models of expressive voting postulate that voters will 'consume' ideological stances on issues by voting for them, even when they are against the voter's own narrow self interest, if the probability of being a decisive voter is low. When a voter is unlikely to sway the outcome, the odds that a voter will incur any real personal cost (a higher tax burden, for example) from her own expressive vote is small. We test & find support for Tullock's straightforward empirical implication of this model, that government welfare (transfer) payments are inversely related to the probability of being the decisive voter. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 119, Heft 1, S. 143-160
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, S. 569-571
SSRN
In: Research policy: policy, management and economic studies of science, technology and innovation, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 104900
ISSN: 1873-7625
In: Economics & politics, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 104-151
ISSN: 1468-0343
AbstractThere is a large literature examining the macroeconomic effects of state economic development incentives on employment, income, tax revenue, and growth. At best, these incentives are found to be weakly effective at job creation, but inefficient due to the distortions, secondary effects, and increased rent‐seeking they encourage, with little public accountability. Given the evidence on their inefficiency, what explains their continued popularity? We find that large development incentives create substantial benefits for incumbent politicians in the form of both higher campaign contributions (particularly from business, labor, and construction sectors) and higher margins of victory at election time. Thus, political rent extraction may be the best explanation for the continued existence and popularity of these relatively ineffective incentive programs in states.
This is Old Dominion University's 14th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion or it's president, John R. Broderick. The report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region's many successes, but realize that it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about "where we are" and a sound understanding of the policy options open to us. ; https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books/1005/thumbnail.jpg
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This is Old Dominion University's 13th annual State of the Region Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion or it's president, John R. Broderick. The report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region's many successes, but realize that it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about "where we are" and a sound understanding of the policy options open to us. ; https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books/1006/thumbnail.jpg
BASE