In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 35-41
The author provides an analysis of Russian foreign policy & U.S. engagement in post-Soviet Eurasia & Russia during the Putin administration. Arguing that Russian foreign policy is rooted in Russia's economic interests, the author declares that to understand Russian foreign policy, one must first understand the developing Russian economy & Russia's changing position in the global market place. Next, the author explores how U.S. policy has worked in practice. Remnants of the U.S./Russian Cold War relationship, Russian integration into the west & its role in NATO, & Putin's counterterrorism strategy are explored. J. Harwell
If only realism could prevail, one is tempted to hope, the United States and Russia could work together to meet their common interests in security, stability, and prosperity. Reality, however, just keeps getting in the way.
The role of Western governments in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was complex. The two most important factors that undermined the Soviet state were the deepening economic chaos under Mikhail Gorbachev and the rapid growth of internal political dissent. Western policies tended to magnify both of these factors. This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev's original decision to embark on an economic reform program was simply the result of pressure created by Western defense spending and military deployments. The Soviet economy was plagued by severe weaknesses, of which the misallocation of resources and excessive military expenditures were only a small part. Gorbachev's initial economic reforms were spurred by his awareness of the country's general economic problems. After the first round of reforms failed, he sensed that arms control and reductions in military spending would be helpful for the next stage. Even so, the belated cuts he made in military spending (beginning in 1990) were of relatively little consequence. The West's refusal to pour money into the Soviet system without evidence of structural reform in the last years of the Soviet regime, and Western pressure on Gorbachev not to crack down on political dissent and separatism, did hasten the Soviet collapse. These policies denied the Soviet system resources that might have prolonged its survival, and they helped to deter Gorbachev from using decisive force against elements that were splitting the Soviet Union apart.
The role of Western governments in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was complex. The two most important factors that undermined the Soviet state were the deepening economic chaos under Mikhail Gorbachev & the rapid growth of internal political dissent. Western policies tended to magnify both of these factors. This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev's original decision to embark on an economic reform program was simply the result of pressure created by Western defense spending & military deployments. The Soviet economy was plagued by severe weaknesses, of which the misallocation of resources & excessive military expenditures were only a small part. Gorbachev's initial economic reforms were spurred by his awareness of the country's general economic problems. After the first round of reforms failed, he sensed that arms control & reductions in military spending would be helpful for the next stage. Even so, the belated cuts he made in military spending (beginning in 1990) were of relatively little consequence. The West's refusal to pour money into the Soviet system without evidence of structural reform in the last years of the Soviet regime, & Western pressure on Gorbachev not to crack down on political dissent & separatism, did hasten the Soviet collapse. These policies denied the Soviet system resources that might have prolonged its survival, & they helped to deter Gorbachev from using decisive force against elements that were splitting the Soviet Union apart. Adapted from the source document.