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"Realism and Security" published on by Oxford University Press.

Unipolarity is a novel condition in world politics, and its effects on international alliances have yet to receive sustained theoretical attention. Tracing its impact requires a careful distinction between the purely structural features common to any unipolar system and the unique characteristics of the current unipole (the United States) or the policies undertaken by particular U.S. leaders (such as George W. Bush). In general, the unipole will enjoy greater freedom of action and be less dependent on allied support, enabling it to rely more readily on ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Lesser powers will be concerned about the concentration of power held by the unipole, but they will also face larger barriers to concerted action to contain it. Hard balancing against the unipole will be unlikely-unless the unipole begins a major effort to expand-but lesser powers will engage in soft balancing to contain the latter's influence. Medium powers may pursue alliances with others in order to reduce dependence on the unipole, but weaker states are likely to ally with the unipole in order to use its power against local security challenges. Bandwagoning will remain rare even under unipolarity, but disputes over burden sharing and alliance leadership will continue. Weaker states will prefer multilateral arrangements that enhance their own influence, while the unipole will prefer bilateral or ad hoc coalitions of the willing that it can more readily dominate. Adapted from the source document.

Unipolarity is a novel condition in world politics, and its effects on international alliances have yet to receive sustained theoretical attention. Tracing its impact requires a careful distinction between the purely structural features common to any unipolar system and the unique characteristics of the current unipole (the United States) or the policies undertaken by particular U.S. leaders (such as George W. Bush). In general, the unipole will enjoy greater freedom of action and be less dependent on allied support, enabling it to rely more readily on ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Lesser powers will be concerned about the concentration of power held by the unipole, but they will also face larger barriers to concerted action to contain it. Hard balancing against the unipole will be unlikely—unless the unipole begins a major effort to expand—but lesser powers will engage in soft balancing to contain the latter's influence. Medium powers may pursue alliances with others in order to reduce dependence on the unipole, but weaker states are likely to ally with the unipole in order to use its power against local security challenges. Bandwagoning will remain rare even under unipolarity, but disputes over burden sharing and alliance leadership will continue. Weaker states will prefer multilateral arrangements that enhance their own influence, while the unipole will prefer bilateral or ad hoc coalitions of the willing that it can more readily dominate.

▪ Abstract  Policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR, and many scholars seem uninterested in doing policy-relevant work. These tendencies are unfortunate because theory is an essential tool of statecraft. Many policy debates ultimately rest on competing theoretical visions, and relying on a false or flawed theory can lead to major foreign policy disasters. Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of different policies. Unfortunately, the norms and incentives that currently dominate academia discourage many scholars from doing useful theoretical work in IR. The gap between theory and policy can be narrowed only if the academic community begins to place greater value on policy-relevant theoretical work.

Policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR, & many scholars seem uninterested in doing policy-relevant work. These tendencies are unfortunate because theory is an essential tool of statecraft. Many policy debates ultimately rest on competing theoretical visions, & relying on a false or flawed theory can lead to major foreign policy disasters. Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, & evaluating the impact of different policies. Unfortunately, the norms & incentives that currently dominate academia discourage many scholars from doing useful theoretical work in IR. The gap between theory & policy can be narrowed only if the academic community begins to place greater value on policy-relevant theoretical work. 63 References. Adapted from the source document.

Now that the war in Iraq "just keeps getting messier every day" and U.S. support "is plummeting" with thousands of American troops dying, those who supported the war initially are creating "after-the-fact alibis" to cover their tracks. Article examines these "excuses" for voting and supporting the invasion of Iraq, a nation now on the brink of civil war. The members of congress, pundits, and the presidential cabinet are chastised for not seeing the facts from the start of the war and are now lying to cover up their poor judgment. Author points out Donald Rumsfeld, President Bush, Ann Coulter and Rush Limbaugh specifically in this liberal article.