Suchergebnisse
Filter
39 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
Working paper
Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 10, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
In a model with internal and external risks together with incentive problems, this paper investigates the role of a risky environment on contractual incompleteness. We consider a typical employment contract with an extra control option. This option is contractable ex ante, exercisable ex post, and good for incentives. But, the employer may choose not to have it in a contract. We identify some interesting circumstances under which the option is not in the optimal contract. Our main findings are that (1) external risks determine contractual incompleteness, and (2) a complete contract can better handle incentives, while an incomplete contract can better handle external risks. Hence, our analysis of incomplete contracts is somewhat consistent with Williamson's (1985) idea of low-powered incentives inside the firm and high-powered incentives outside the firm.
The optimality of contingent fees in the agency problem of litigation
In: International review of law and economics, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 23-31
ISSN: 0144-8188
Multiple Objectives in Fiscal Policy: The Case of Taxation
SSRN
Working paper
The Irrelevance of Control Rights in Agency Models under Risk Neutrality
SSRN
Working paper
Efficient Venture Capital Market
In: HKUST Business School Research Paper No. 2024-159
SSRN
Boundary of the firm with endogenous firm structure
In: The journal of financial research: the journal of the Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 797-816
ISSN: 1475-6803
AbstractWe study the boundary of the firm with endogenous firm structure. The firm has two restructuring options: internal restructuring by which the firm centralizes or decentralizes decision making, or external restructuring by which the firm spins off a division. We investigate the firm's restructuring options to determine its boundary based on the optimal firm structure. Our conclusion depends on market uncertainty, market size, market competition, synergy among divisions, and coordination costs. We find that when market uncertainty rises, a decentralized firm (D‐firm) conducts internal restructuring, whereas a centralized firm (C‐firm) conducts external restructuring. A D‐firm chooses to stay put when market competition intensifies, whereas a C‐firm chooses to conduct either internal or external restructuring depending on whether a positive synergy exists among its divisions.
Internal labor markets with two types of promotion and two tiers of salary: theory and evidence from China
In: China economic review, Band 72, S. 101756
ISSN: 1043-951X
Network Effects, Trade, and Productivity
In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Band 2019, Heft 40(7)
SSRN
A contractual analysis of state versus private ownership
In: China economic review, Band 43, S. 142-168
ISSN: 1043-951X
Staged Privatization: Transforming State-Owned Enterprises into Market-Based Firms
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 172, Heft 4, S. 694
ISSN: 1614-0559
Staged privatization: transforming state-owned enterprises into market-based firms
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 172, Heft 4, S. 694-726
ISSN: 0932-4569
World Affairs Online
SSRN
Working paper
Optimality of the 51:49 Equity Structure
In: Economics Letters, Forthcoming
SSRN
Staged privatization: A market process with multistage lockups
In: China economic review, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 1051-1070
ISSN: 1043-951X