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The dramatic transformation of the climate surrounding relations between rich and poor nations since the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 has raised new hopes that MNCs may be made to energize development in the Third World. Improved information about the vulnerability of the rich nations and about techniques for dealing with MNCs, some writers argue, will enable underdeveloped countries to ensure that foreign investment serves as an "engine of development." This view exaggerates the strengths of Third World states. A lack of information about opportunities and techniques is a small part of the burden which underdevelopment imposes on poor countries in their dealings with MNCs. A case study of Japanese MNCs in Southeast Asia raises doubts concerning the likelihood that the poor countries will be able to harness MNCs for their development. Southeast Asia's growing dependence on Japan in the fields of trade, official development aid, and private investment tends to impose constraints on efforts to influence the behavior of MNCs. A more basic problem resides in the "softness" of underdeveloped states, which renders ineffectual regulations intended to control MNCs. Because MNCs in certain important respects inhibit the process of building viable indigenous institutions and even contribute to the perpetuation of soft states, they may do more to impede than to stimulate development, at least in the softer Third World states. It may well be that more serious attention should be paid to studies of how Third World states might develop if the role of MNCs were circumscribed.

Most of the writing on foreign policy in the less developed countries stresses either the importance of idiosyncratic sources of policy or the identification of a number of relatively long-term factors which influence the formation of policy. These studies are helpful in many ways, but in one important respect they are unsatisfying. They do not give us a clear picture of how foreign policy relates to the political and economic problems that constitute the essence of being a less developed country.

2 concepts of commitment are distinguished: (a) situational (focusing on the rationality of the specified course of action in light of the requirements of the situation); (b) nonsituational (focusing mainly on the need to keep commitments in order to serve interests outside the immediate situation). A situational commitment is merely a statement of a country's present view of its interests; a nonsituation commitment is a binding & permanent pledge. These 2 concepts are applied to various examples of internat'l relations from recent & not so recent history. It is seen that today France is an exponent of the situational view, whereas the US takes a nonsituational approach. The implications of these diff's are explored. In Europe & in Asia, disagreements between Washington & Paris can be attributed, at least in part, to a conflict which pits France's situational concept of commitments against the US's conception of commitments as nonsituational. Washington & Paris may not be aware of the diff meaning which each attributes to the concept of commitment. It is necessary that gov's become more fully aware of conflicting concepts of commitment & of the role that they play in the exacerbation of internat'l problems. Even more urgent is the need for gov's to be cognizant of the implications which their concept of commitment may have in light of the internat'l system's apparent evolution toward multipolarity. The question of the limitations of interdependence must by confronted. The situational view suggests that under pressure nations will have to rely primarily on themselves. According to the nonsituational view, confidence that the major powers will keep their commitment to punish aggression is indispensable to the security of all nations & the stability of the internat'l system. In a multipolar world, the prevalence of either view of commitment would pose certain dangers. Prevalence of the situational view might make the internat'l system unstable & promote reckless aggression; prevalence of the nonsituational view would be conducive to turning small wars into big ones. It leads to irrational commitments which might have to be carried out to preserve the credibility of other commitments. M. Maxfield.