Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Board of Editors -- Aims and Scope -- Contents -- The Changing Nature of Territoriality in International Law -- 1 The Paradoxical Place of Territory in International Law -- Abstract -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Reshaping the Notion of Territory in International Law -- 1.2.1 Territoriality and Functionalism -- 1.2.2 Territoriality and Cosmopolitanism -- 1.2.3 Territoriality and Technology -- 1.3 Overview of Chapters -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- 2 A State Without Territory? -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 State as a Territorial Unit? -- 2.2.1 The Montevideo Definition of the State -- 2.2.2 The Concept of a Deterritorialized State -- 2.2.3 The Functional Theory of the State Territory -- 2.3 Historical Examples of Deterritorialized States? -- 2.3.1 New States Established Without Territory? -- 2.3.2 States Surviving the Loss of Their Territory? -- 2.3.3 The Lack of Historical Precedents -- 2.4 Recent Examples of Deterritorialized States? -- 2.4.1 The Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.2 Possible Legal Responses to the Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.3 Deterritorialized State as a Response to the Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.4 Creation of New Deterritorialized States -- 2.4.5 Alternatives to the Concept of Deterritorialized State -- 2.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Territory in the Law of Jurisdiction: Imagining Alternatives -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Centrality of Territory in the Modern Legal Doctrine of Jurisdiction -- 3.3 Unpacking the Epistemic Bias Toward Territory -- 3.4 Non-Spatial Alternatives to Territory -- 3.4.1 Community -- 3.4.2 Temporality -- 3.4.3 Justice -- 3.5 Reconceptualizing Territory -- 3.6 Acknowledging the Political Nature of the 'New Territoriality' -- 3.7 Beholding Transnational Human Rights Claims: Donning Spatial and Non-Territorial Lenses

AbstractThe individualisation of punishment is a key element in liberal narratives about international law and international relations. This narrative has become an integral part of positive international law, especially the regimes governing the use of force and the prosecution of an international crimes. Rather than punishing states or entire societies, liberals claim, punishment has become restricted to those who incurred individual guilt. To liberals, the individualisation of punishment is part of a larger process of enlightenment and civilisation that has helped to fence atavisms like revenge. We do not question the emergence of an ever more sophisticated system of individual punishment in international law. However, we argue that punitivity has been more difficult to fully channel towards individuals and away from collectives than claimed. To be sure, punitive language has by and large been banned from the laws of armed conflict. We argue, however, that the absence of a punitive vocabulary does not equal the absence of punitivity. In contrast, current state practices of using armed force are still imbued with punitivity, however silenced in the current legal framework and thus pushed underground. Realising the presence of a punitive undercurrent, we argue, adds to a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary state practices.

We use the works of Diogenes and Zeno to argue that the cosmopolitan world view remains torn between negation and conformation; between anti-conventional resistance against and super-conventional organization of power. In their separate codes and relations to convention, Diogenes and Zeno expose complementary and conflictual sides of cosmopolitanism: in Diogenes, a challenge to local regimes, and in Zeno a plan for overcoming them; but in Diogenes a political programme that cannot attain its own ends, and in Zeno a political solution that comes unmoored from its foundations. Today, the International Criminal Court combines the two elements of cosmopolitanism in its responses to international crimes. In short, the particular practices of international criminal law and its grand gestures are in tension, undermining the aspiration to a positive programme of justice. We illustrate the tension that results through a discussion of two of the artworks that form the topic of this special issue of the Utrecht Law Review. As a result, the enterprise of international criminal justice, like the cosmopolitan programme that we trace back to Diogenes and Zeno, appears to become self-defeating.

This article analyses legal aspects of the `war on terror'. It argues that, by making recourse to a semantic of risk, danger and, in particular, precaution, the `war on terror' blurs crucial political and legal categories of public and private, of peace and war, of combatants and civilians, thus redefining the relationship between political responsibility, time and security. As a consequence, the extrajudicial killing of individuals becomes a form of risk management that takes place beyond established mechanisms of accountability.