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The institutionalization of factions in Ukraine's parliament has proceeded in a patchy, uneven manner as a consequence of cross-cutting incentives created by the Constitution, lower order rules and the actions of the president. Although factions became more organizationally complex and disciplined, membership instability significantly undermined these developments so that factions remained weakly institutionalized. Despite this, factions came to exercise greater influence over the parliamentary leadership and the legislative process, largely thanks to the formation of Ukraine's first parliamentary majority in 2000. However, as this majority was orchestrated by President Kuchma, Ukraine's parliament remained vulnerable to external pressure.

Aufgrund der dieses Jahr in Kraft getretenen Verfassungsänderungen wird zum ersten Mal in der Ukraine das Parlament eine Regierungskoalition bilden und die Regierungsposten besetzen müssen. Dieses bedeutet, dass "Einsatz" und "Beute" für diejenigen Parteien, die die 3%-Hürde überwinden konnten, potenziell sehr viel größer sind als früher. Und bereits früher hat das ukrainische Parlament, die Werchowna Rada, sich immer schwer getan, die "Beute" an Posten aufzuteilen. Die geänderte Verfassung lässt den Abgeordneten einen Monat, um eine Koalition zu bilden und einen weiteren Monat für die Regierungsbildung. Angesichts der neuen Kräftekonstellation in der Rada und der persönlichen und politischen Feindschaften zwischen den Vertretern der größten Parteien, könnte sich die Einhaltung dieser Frist als schwierig erweisen. Während sich die Hauptakteure prinzipiell darauf geeinigt haben, dass eine "Orangene Koalition" wünschenswert wäre, werden die Verhandlungen über Posten erneut schwierig sein. Noch schwerer wird es dann, eine eventuelle Koalition zusammenzuhalten, nicht nur wegen unvermeidbarer interner Machtkämpfe, sondern auch, weil die geänderte Verfassung die Beziehungen zwi- schen den einzelnen Gewalten nicht definiert und vielleicht mehr Probleme schaffen könnte als sie löst.

Ukraine's state-building experience during the Leonid Kuchma years was uneven & multi-directional, not only between institutions but also within them. This article takes a Weberian definition of the state & seeks to evaluate progress made in building the state's capacity to exercise core functions such as extraction & decision-making by surveying two institutions that are central to a state's ability to perform these tasks: the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) & the tax system. The aim is not to quantify institutional development & performance in these institutions, but to provide an overview that will facilitate a broad-brush assessment of key aspects of state building in the decade between 1994 & 2004. These cases illustrate the variegated & ambiguous nature of state building under Kuchma.

Protest performances inside parliament articulated claims to uphold democracy that contributed to the maintenance of pluralism in Ukraine during attempted authoritarian consolidation. Simultaneously, such protests were para-institutional instruments in the ongoing power struggle engendered by a patronal system where formal institutions and norms weakly constrain actors. A diverse repertoire of protest, including rostrum-blocking, visual protest, withdrawal, auditory disruption, somatic protest and the spectacle, was used frequently and was adapted in response to changes in the political opportunity structure. Innovations to the repertoire adapted performances from social movements. In recent years, violent altercations and theatrical protests in Ukraine's parliament involving tens of deputies have attracted attentive publics to a wide range of issues from language use, imprisoned opposition politicians and deputies' multiple voting violations, but such spectacular performances belie hundreds of routinised deputies' protests on procedural and policy matters. Both raise important questions about Ukraine's political system and democratic practice1 more widely. How should we understand such protests, which are conducted by elected representatives that are already privileged in the system of power and have a range of formal legislative tools for protest at their disposal (Spary 2013), but choose instead to disrupt parliamentary proceedings? Why were such modes of behaviour so prevalent in Ukraine? What do the adaptation of distinctive types of protest reveal about the political system? Could such protests actually signify the vibrancy of democratic practice in Ukraine?

This research departs from conventional studies of citizen's attitudes to parliament by utilising focus groups to interrogate the incredibly low levels of trust in Ukraine's parliament during the Yanukovych and Poroshenko presidencies and explores how far they are related to the exceptionally high levels of disruptive protest in the chamber. Low trust is shaped primarily by citizens' concerns about corruption, particularly the role of FIGs and of deputies' rapacious and lawless behaviour (bezpredel). Disruptive protests were largely seen as inauthentic. Low trust was accompanied by support for democracy.

Unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die Prioritäten bei den Reformen im Verteidigungsbereich nach 2014, Unstimmigkeiten bei den Erfolgskriterien für diese Reformen und das Fehlen einer klaren Vision darüber, welche Art Streitkräfte die Ukraine benötigt, haben zu Schwierigkeiten in der Partnerschaft zwischen der NATO und der Ukraine geführt.

Unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die Prioritäten bei den Reformen im Verteidigungsbereich nach 2014, Unstimmigkeiten bei den Erfolgskriterien für diese Reformen und das Fehlen einer klaren Vision darüber, welche Art Streitkräfte die Ukraine benötigt, haben zu Schwierigkeiten in der Partnerschaft zwischen der NATO und der Ukraine geführt.

Vladimir Putin's United Russia and Nursultan Nazabayev's Nur Otan represent a distinctive type of dominant party due to their personalist nature and dependence on their presidential patrons. Such personalism deprives these parties of the agency to perform key roles in authoritarian reproduction typically expected of dominant parties, such as resource distribution, policy-making and mobilizing mass support for the regime. Instead United Russia and Nur Otan have contributed to authoritarian consolidation by securing the president's legislative agenda, stabilizing elites to ensure their patron's hold on power, and assisting in perpetuating a discourse around the national leader. However, because these parties lack the agency to reproduce themselves, to entrench their position, and to play more than a supportive role in regime consolidation, the lifespan of such personalist dominant parties is likely to be significantly shorter than that of dominant parties. Adapted from the source document.