Suchergebnisse

The present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social security as the outcome of a public decision-making process in an endogenous growth economy. It employs a model in which there is a non-monotonic relationship between productivity growth & the scale of public intergenerational redistribution. The paper shows that although unfunded social security need not harm growth in general, it is likely to harm growth in a democracy. This effect is reinforced by population aging. 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 31 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper analyzes the intergenerational incidence of wage and consumption taxes imposed to finance a given amount of public expenditures. It employs a continuous time overlapping genera-tions framework to demonstrate that it essentially hinges on the relationship between the age-earnings and age-consumption profiles of the households which generations bear the major burden of wage respectively consumption taxes. Furthermore, the paper points to some political economy implications of the incidence of wage and consumption taxes.

Within a politico-economic model we first establish three hypotheses: (i) Retirees generally prefer a higher retirement age than workers, whereby just retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age, (ii) in equilibrium the level of the legal retirement age is increasing in longevity and (iii) decreasing in the public pension replacement rate. We then test these hypotheses empirically. Employing micro data for Germany we corroborate the first hypothesis with descriptive regressions and a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design. We show that just retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increase in the legal retirement age. On the basis of cross country panel IV regressions we provide evidence for the second and third hypothesis. We demonstrate that a one percentage point increase in the share of the elderly increases the legal retirement age by 0.3 to 0.5 years, and that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate reduces the legal retirement age by 0.5 to 3 years. We conclude that if policy contains the generosity of public pensions, increasing the legal retirement age becomes politically more feasible.

Within a politico-economic model we first establish three hypotheses: (i) Retirees generally prefer a higher retirement age than workers, whereby just retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age, (ii) in equilibrium the level of the legal retirement age is increasing in longevity and (iii) decreasing in the public pension replacement rate. We then test these hypotheses empirically. Employing micro data for Germany we corroborate the first hypothesis with descriptive regressions and a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design. We show that just retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increase in the legal retirement age. On the basis of cross country panel IV regressions we provide evidence for the second and third hypothesis. We demonstrate that a one percentage point increase in the share of the elderly increases the legal retirement age by 0.3 to 0.5 years, and that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate reduces the legal retirement age by 0.5 to 3 years. We conclude that if policy contains the generosity of public pensions, increasing the legal retirement age becomes politically more feasible.

Sowohl Deutschland als auch Griechenland haben ab 2010 ihre Tabaksteuern erhöht. Beide Länder erheben Tabaksteuern insbesondere zu Einnahmezwecken, verfolgen daneben aber auch Lenkungsziele. Vor allem in Griechenland wurde auch die Struktur der Tabaksteuer von einem überwiegenden Anteil einer Wertsteuer hin zu einer Mengensteuer entwickelt. Der Vergleich der beiden Länder zeigt, dass es dem deutschen Steuerstaat gelingt, einen stabilen Einnahmefluss zu generieren, während die griechische Tabakwarenbesteuerung insbesondere zu Steuervermeidungsaktivitäten der Raucher führt. ; Both Germany and Greece increased tobacco taxes beginning in 2010. Tobacco taxation in both countries is primarily aimed at generating revenues and at steering the behaviour of individuals affected by the taxation. The tobacco tax structure particularly in Greece has evolved from a mainly ad valorem excise to a specific excise. The comparison of both countries shows that the German tax system is able to generate stable revenues while Greek tobacco taxation policy leads to tax evasion activities among smokers.

Fiscal restraints have been argued to force today's governments to internalize the externalities that result from extensive borrowing on future electorates and governments as well as on other countries by causing fiscal instability. In this article we provide an alternative argument for fiscal restraints which is based on an agency perspective on government. A budget maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. In this respect, the politician is an expert in the meaning of the credence good literature. The electorate, being able to observe the budget but not the necessary level of spending, will reelect a government if its budget does not exceed a critical level. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government will choose if the reelection level is not sufficient to ensure the state's ability to provide services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are required.

AbstractThe interrelations of taxation and federal structure have been extensively analysed from various perspectives. The present paper looks at two competing countries of different institutional structures. It examines how the tax rates set at each level of both countries vary in a given setting, when a federal and a unitary country compete for mobile tax base, or both countries are organised as federations. The paper discusses whether or not tax rates set in every jurisdiction will be too high or too low in equilibrium. The externalities triggered by a tax regime change are analysed and the respective impact on revenues is considered. The results essentially hinge on the relative strategic interaction of tax rates, as well as the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate.