Suchergebnisse

Can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability? A behavioral measure of the population's desire for better governance was designed to examine this question. A postcard was distributed to households promising that if enough postcards were mailed back, results from a survey module on perceived corruption would be published in the national media. Data from a tailored household survey were used to examine the determinants of this behavioral measure of demand for political accountability (undertaking the costly action of mailing the postcard) and to isolate the positive effect of international emigration using locality-level variation. The estimated effects are robust to the use of instrumental variables, including past migration and macro shocks in the destination countries. The estimated effects can be attributed mainly to migrants who emigrated to countries with better governance, especially migrants who return home.

When are high earnings considered a legitimate target for redistribution, and when not? We design a real-effort laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the assignment of payrates (societal 'reward rules') that translate performance on a real-effort counting task into pre-tax earnings. We then ask subjects to vote on a flat tax rate in groups of three. We distinguish three treatment conditions: the same payrate for all group members ('equal' reward rule), differential (low, medium and high) but random payrates ('luck' rule), and differential payrates based on subjects' performance on a quiz with voluntary preparation opportunity ('merit' rule). Self-interest is the dominant tax voting motivation. Tax levels are lower under 'merit' rule than under 'luck' rule, and merit reasoning overrides political ideology. But information is needed to activate merit reasoning. Both these latter effects are present only when voters have 'full merit knowledge' that signals precisely how others obtained their incomes.

When are high earnings considered a legitimate target for redistribution, and when not? We design a real-effort laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the assignment of payrates (societal "reward rules") that translate performance on a real-effort counting task into pre-tax earnings. We then ask subjects to vote on a flat tax rate in groups of three. We distinguish three treatment conditions: the same payrate for all group members ("equal" reward rule), differential (low, medium, and high) but random payrates ("luck" rule), and differential payrates based on subjects' performance on a quiz with voluntary preparation opportunity ("merit" rule). Self-interest is the dominant tax voting motivation. Tax levels are lower under "merit" rule than under "luck" rule, and merit reasoning overrides political ideology. But information is needed to activate merit reasoning. Both these latter effects are present only when voters have "full merit knowledge" that signals precisely how others obtained their incomes.

We analyze trust in electronic voting in Latin America using data from two field experiments conducted in Argentina and Colombia. We find that voters generally exhibit high levels of confidence in e-voting, although this depends on individual characteristics such as age and education, as well as on the particular type of technology used. We contrast our findings with those from industrialized democracies and show that conclusions derived from American and European e-voting experiences cannot be directly extrapolated to the Latin American context. Overall, our results suggest that e-voting could provide an attractive alternative to traditional voting procedures in the region. Adapted from the source document.

Educational qualifications for voting. For Language Information Service Interpreter Releases 4:52-5 Mr 28 '27.